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ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to examine the economic factors motivating Australian
listed lessee firms to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure of their finance lease
commitments from 1985 to 1987 as permitted by the transitional provision of AAS 17.
Six research hypotheses are developed from the economic consequences perspective. It is
hypothesised that the decision to capitalize finance lease commitments is positively
related to firm's: (I) corporate structure. (2) size, (3) political visibility. (4) financial
performance, and (5) overseas association. and negatively related to (6} debt contract
financial constraints. Support for these hypotheses would be construed as suggesting
that capitalization is a means for lessee firms to reduce or mitigate agency and/or
political costs and concurrently as a signal to the market that they are high quality
firms. A pooled multivariate cross-sectional analysis for 1985 to 1987 was performed
incorporating sensitivity analysis to determine the Mbest" logistic regression model. This
model was then assessed to determine its validity and predictive efficacy. Tak�n as a
whole, i.e.. from 1985 to 1987. the sample consists of 314 Jessee firms selected from the
Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM) Annual Report File: 67 firms in the
capitalizer group and 314 flrr.,s in the non-capitalizer group. The results provide
consistent evidence that less�e firms adopted the rapitalization as a response to Ll-ie
perception by the media as being politically visible firms and concurrently as a signal to
the market that they are high quality firms. Even though the "best" model is significant.
valid in terms of generalisable beyond the sample, and efficacious in their predictive
accuracy, it exhibits only modest explanatory power. The evidence of this stu�y also
questions the usefulness of a lengthy transitional period.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the economic factors motivating Australian listed lessee
companies to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure of their finance lease I
commitments during the period 1985 to 1987. as permitted by the transitional provtslon
of accounting standard AAS 17: Accounting for Leases (Australian Accounting Research
Foundation [MRFJ, Accounting Standards Board [ASBI, 1984).

Background of the study

The measurement and disclosure aspects of leases. especially finance leases, were
vexing and conter.tious issues in Australia (Roberts. 1980: Whitt.red & Zimmer. 1992).
Even though the provisions of AAS 17 became mandatory on or after I January 1988,
Morns & Carnegie (1988) and Morris (1990) reported that there were a number of listed
lessee compantes which had adopted the standard during the phase-in period from 1985
to 1987. This decision concerning the choice of the adoption date represents viable
research opportunities.

Wilkins and Mok (1991) analysed lessee firms' discretionary finance lease
accounting policy choice (i.e.. either capitalization or footnote rlisclosure) during the first
year (1985) of the phase-in period. In :summary. the univariate findings of their study
indicate r.hat whilst leverage. interest coverage. increase in profits, and increase In
interest coverage influence managements' choice of finance lease disclosure, profits,
increase in leverage. size, industry, and audit firm do not appear to influence the
Originally, AAS 17 defined a finance lease as �a lease which effectively transfers from
the lessor to the lessee substantially all the risks and benefits tncident to the
ownership of the leased property.· (para 5) However, the revised AAS 17 and also ASRB
1008 (AARF, ASB, and Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB), 1987) defines a
finance lease as any lease which is not an operating lease. Thus, a finance lease is a
lease that effectively (tn the economic rather than legal sensr,) represents the purchase
of an asset.
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accounting policy choice, "managers make capitalization decisions aimed at maximising
near term profits and minimising accounting measure of financial risk" (p, 177). In a
later study, Wilkins and Mok (1993) conclude that "capitalization has a material and
significant impact on Australian . . . firm financial statements and key financial
performance indicators" (p. 58).2

Slgnlftcance of the study

A unique characteristic of MS 17 was that it had a transitional provision,
which allowed firms to choose the implementation time between the standard'&
operative date and its mandatory date. However, early compliance with the standard was
encouraged. The implication of the transitional provision was it allowed firms to be:
selective and it provided an opportunity for these firms to time compliance with the
standard to their advantage. For example. for earnings management effects (including
income smoothing}. 3

Wilkins and Mok ( 1991) were the first to analyse the economic determinants
motivating lessee firms to either capitalize their finance lease commitments or to disclose
these commitments via footnote disclosure in the first year of the transitional period.
This study attempts to extend and refine the study by Wilkins and Mok in two aspects.
First, this study employs a combination of contracting theory and signalling theory
approaches, to be discussed in Chapter 4. and consequently a different set of
independent variables than those used by Wilkins and Mok. Second, it performs a

2

These findings should be Interpreted with care. This is because It is not clear whether
the effects (either positive or negative) on lessees' financial statements and key
financial performance indicators are the result of capttall7..ation of finance lease
commitments only. It ls plausible that other factors contributed to such changes. For
example. there ts evidence to indicate that firms use a portfolio of accounting policies
rather than single accounting policy in reporting their financial positions and
performances (Zmijewski & Hagerman. 1981}.

3

Earnings management refers to managers· decisions in changing or selecting
accounting policies that would increase their compensation or reduce the probabWty of
debt covenants violations. The objective of Income smoothing is to reduce eamtngs
fluctuations (Pincus & Wasley. 1994: Watts & Zimmerman. 1990).

n

pooled cross-sectional analysts of the characteristics for capitalizers and non
capitalizers during the whole phase-in period (i.e., 1985 to 1987). These extensions are
deliberated in Chapter 5.

Objective of the study

The main purpose of this study is to explain managements' decisions regarding
finance lease accounting choices for the whole phase-in period ( 1985 to 1987). The
result of a pooled analysis would provide evidence of any variation between the two
groups of firms. i.e .. the capitalizers and footnote disclosers. throughout the transitional
period. The findings of this study complement the findings of Wilkins and Mok (1991)
and expand the accounting policy choices literature by providing another perspective,
through contracting and signalling theory. to the understanding of managements'
choices in finance lease accounting.

Contrlbuilon of the study

Besides providing an understanding of managements' motives in finance lease
accounting policy choices. this study makes a contribution in two aspects. First. this
study proposes that a better understanding of managements' accounting policy c.hoices
C'an be achieved by explicitly including signalling theory into the economic consequences
framework in developing the research hypotheses. A combined contracting-signalling
theory of the economic consequences paradigm will better explain the phenomenon
than a separate contracting theory or signalling theory analyses. Second, the findings of
this study will also provide a preliminary view on the usefulness of a lengthy transitional
(or phase-in) provision in an accounting standard. Whilst there is a cost/benefit
argument supporting such provision (Langer & Lev. 1993), there is also a claim that a
transitional provision provides firms with opportunity to indirectly manipulate their
income (Pincus & Wasley, 1994).

12

Organlaatlon @f the study

This thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter discusses the nature and
prevailing situation of accounting for leases. Chapter 3 presents the re\.1ew of the related
literature of this study. Specifically, it critically analyses previous similar studies as
appeared in the literature. Cilapter 4 deliberates the theoretical framework and also the
formulation of the relevant hypotheses of this study. Following this, Chapter 5 describes
the research method, which includes a discussion on sample selection, definition of
variables. data sources, and research design. Chapters 6 reports and deliberatef the
results of the statistical analyses performed in this study. Chapter 7 is the final chapter
of this thesis. It provides the summary and conclusions of this study. It also presents
alternative plausibie hypotheses. limitations and implications of this study, and
suggestions for future research.
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CBAPTER2
LESSEE'S ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES

Introduction

This chapter discusses the various aspects of lease accounting. First, an oveIView
of the development of a lease accounting standard in Australia. Second, a descrtptlon of
the main features of the Australian accounting standard AAS 17. Third, a summary of
the debate on the accounting treatment of finance lease commitments, between
capitalization or footnote disclosure. This discussion will be supported by empirical
evidence where available.

Development of tease accounting standard

Accounting for leases has been a particularly contentious and vexing issue as
reflected by the discussion it generated in the professional and academic Journals during
the period from the late 1970's into the mid- l 980's (e.g .. AARF. 1979; Long, 1985; Reilly.
1984: Roberts 1980; Roberts 1981; Wise & Wise, 1985; Woodhams. i985). An accounting
standard on leases was considered relevant and appropriate because of the following
reasons. First. leasing had grown in significance ln firms' capital structure over the years
(Bazley, Brown & lzan 1985; Harris, 1983). Second, prior to 1985, there was a diversity of
practices in the reporting of lease transactions in the annual reports of lessees and
lessors (Harris, 1983; Stevenson, 1984). Third, the influence of overseas developments
and implementation of leasing accounting standards - the International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC) issued IAS 1 7 in 1982; the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB - USA) issued SFAS No. 13 in 1976; the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants (CICA - Canada) issued s.3065 of CICA Handbook in 1978; and the
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Accounting Standards Committee (A..� - UK) issued SSAP 21 in 1984.4
The process of promulgating an accounting standard for lease commitments
started in Australia when the profession. through the Australian Accounting Research
Foundation (AARF) initially releast:d a Discussion Paper No.

1 ..Accounting for

Leases· in

1979 (AARF, 1979). This was followed by Exposure Draft No. 17 in December 1980
(AARF, 1980).5 In view of the responses and criticisms received on the exposure draft

(Roberts, 1982}.

a

revised discussion paper was released in April 1983 (MRF. 1983) .6

AAS 17: Accounting for Leases (AARF. Accounting Standards Board (ASB), 1984) was

finally issued in March 1984 and was re-issued in June 1987 following its approval by
the Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) as approved accounting standard ASRB
1008: Accounting for Leases (ASRB, 1986) in August 1986. In all essential respects, the

approved standard and AAS 17 are consistent (Whittred & Zimmer. 1992).

Features of AAS 17

As this study concer;1s the choice of accounting method for finance leases by
lessees. there are three featmes of AAS 17 that are relevant for further discussion. They
are:

4

For an oveiview of the comparability of the Australian leasing standard (AAS l 71 wtth
those of the international community, see Australian Accounting Standards Board
(1994). On an overall basis, MS l 7 is conslstt>nt with IAS 17, SFAS 13 and SSAP 21.
However, SFAS 13 is considered to be more comprehensive than MS 17 (Ernst and
Young. 1991).

5

A total of 49 effective responses to the exposure draft were received. On the issues
regarding the accounting treatment of finance lease commitments by lessees, 21
respondents supported Mcapitalization only", while 12 respondents supported
Mdisclosure only". In addltlon, many of the respondents who supported the optional
approach of the EU specified that the capitalization alternative ought to become
mandatory at the end of the proposed three-years trial period (Roberts, 1982).

6

The principal change from the exposure draft concerns the treatment of finance leases
by leasees. The exposure draft proposed an option for lessees to either capitalize
finance leases or provide expanded disclosure of finance leases. This optional
approach attracted criticism from respondents to the exposure draft. The Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) decided that, In view of support for capltalimtton expressed tn
responses to the exposur� draft (Roberts, 1982), and the need for consistent and
comparable treatment of finance leases by lessees, the option should be replaced With a
capitalization requirement.
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Clualflcatlou of leuea

AAS 17 requires lessees and lessors to classify leases as finance or operating on
the basis of economic substance. Where a ,ease effectively transfers substanttally all of
the risks and benefits of ownership of the leased property from the lessor to the lessee, it
should be classified as a finance lease by both the lessee and the lessor (para. 24). Where
substantially all of the risks and benefits of ownership effectively remain with the lessor,
the lease should be classified as an operating lease by both the lessee and the lessor
(para. 25). 7

MS 17 provides guidelines to assist lessees and lessors in applying the basic

concept of transference of risks and benefits of ownership. Classification as a finance
lease by lessees and lessors normally would be expected where the following conditions
are satisfied (para. l 0):

(a)

the lease is non-cancellable: and

[b)

either of the following tests is met:

(i)

the lea:.e term is for 75 per cent or more of the useful life of the leased
property; or

(ii)

the present value, at the beginning of the lease term. of the minimum
lease payment is equal to or greater than 90 per cent of the fair value of
the leased property to the lessor at the inception of the lease. 8

7

See f1...otnote I for the revised definitions of finance and operating leases.

8

Para 12 provides that where a lease contains a bargain purchase option, the amount of
that option, by definition, forms part of the minimum lease payment. Furthermore,
Appendix 1 of AAS 17 also provides that if ownership ls transferred by the end of lease
term, then such lease should be classified as finance lease.
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Critics commented that the gutdellnes are open to subjective interpretation and
that this would also make its implementation and enforcement rather tenuous (Long,
1985; Reilly, 1984: Wise & Wise, 1985: Woodhams, 1985).

Accouatlng for flllance leuea by leueea

The alternative methods of accounting for finance leases by lessees are:
(a}

capitalize the lease, i.e., record the lease as the acquisition of an asset
and the incurrence of a Uabillty; or

(b)

do not capitalize the lease, i.e., account for each minimum lease payment
as an expense in the period in which it is incurred.

The economic substance of a finance lease is that the lessee acquires a right to
the economic benefits from the use of the leased property for the major part of its useful
Ufe. In return, the lessee enters into an obligation to pay for that right an amount which
approximates the fair value of the leased property and the related finance charges. AAS
17 adopts the View that if transactions involving finance leases were not reflected in the
lessee's balance sheet. the economic resources and the level of obligation of an entity
would be understated. Thus. MS 17 requires that finance leases be recorded by lessees
as an asset and as an obligation to pay future rentals. i.e .. the capitalization of finance
leases.

Transitional provision for lessees

AAS 17 permitted lessees, from the operative date of the standard, i.e., 31 March
1985, and for accounting periods ending on or before 31 December 1987, to adopt a
policy of capitalizing all finance leases or to adopt a policy of treating all minimum lease
payments as periodf expenses (para. 60). However, during the transitional (or phase-in)
period, detailed disclosures were required in respect of non-capitalized finance leases so
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as to provide sufficient Information to permit financial statement users to appreciate the
effect on the balance sheet if finance leases had been capitaUzed.

Two reasons were considered to have influenced the provision of the extended
transitional period (Stevenson, 1984: Whlttred & Zimmer, 1992) in AAS 17.9 First, to
provide preparers and users with the opportunity to gain experience 1n presenting and
interpreting information relating to leo:ses. Second, the possible adverse impact 1n terms
of violations of trust deeds brought about by capitalization of finance leases by lessees.
The transitional period would allow affected firms to overcome any such problems, for
example by re-negotiating the trust deeds.

These reasons argue that capitalization of finance leases by lessees could have
economic consequences. The folloWing section discusses the capitalization debate in
depth supported by empirical eVidence from the literature where available.

capitalization debate and emplrlcal evidence

There are basically three arguments advocated by the proponents supporting the
capitalization of finance leases. First. capitalization wnuld better reflect the economic
substance of lessees (Harris, 1983; McGregor 1985; Woodhams. 1985). This is achieved
through: (1) the recognition of a finance lease as a component of total assets employed
and finance lease commitments as component of total liabilities incurred by the lessees
{McGregor, 1985); and (2) the quantification of leasing exposure of lessees (Munter &
Ratcliffe, 1983; Wise & Wise, 1985). As further support, evidence from the literature
indicates that leases and debts are substitutes in firm's capital structure (Marston &
Hams. 1988).

9

Other accounting standards that have an extended phase-In period are: AAS 25
Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans: AAS 26 Financial Reporting .of General
Insurance Activities; AAS 27 Financial Reporting by Local Governments; AAS 29
Financial· Reporting by Government Departments: and AAS 30 Accounting for Employee

Entitlements.

Following from the first argument, proponents of c.4p1tallzation stress that
capitalization wor.l)d aid users 1n their economic decision making because lessees have
less alternative methods for accounting and reporting lease transactions (Harris, 1983).
At the same time, lessees' financial statements would be more comparable between
lessees and with other firm& chat used non-lec�slng debt to finance their assets (Harris,
1983; Munter & Ratcliffe, 1983).

The third and final main argument supporting capitalization is that the other
alternative of footnote disclosure of finance lease transactions is inadequate from users'
perspectives. This argument ls corroborated by the assertions that footnote disclosure
distorts financial ratios of lessees. Evidence indicates that key financial ratios measuring
firms' leverage, profitability and liquidity would be over- or under-stated by keeping
finance lease transactions off-balance sheet when, in fact, they should be properly
reflected in the balance sheet (Abdel-khalik, Berk & Snowball. 1981b; El-Gazaar, 1993;
Imhoff, Lipe & Wright. 1993: Ro. 1978: Wilkins & Zimmer. 1983a). Another claim of the
inadequacy of footnote disclosure is that non-capitalization would allow manipulation
of reported figures to the benefit of lessees and to the disadvantage of users of published
financial statements (Wise & Wise. 1985).

At the other extreme of the debate. proponents for footnote disclosure of finance
leases rather than capitalization had presented credible arguments supporting their
stance. First, capitalization of finance leases would go against the legal principle of
ownership of assets (Harris, 1983; Long, 1985; McGregor, 1985; Wise & Wise, 1985). They
maintain that only assets that are legally owned should be recognised in firms' financial
statements and finance leases are not assets legally owned by lessees. I O Furthermore,
the proponents of footnote disclosure argue that this method would also render lessees'
10

However, this argument seems irrelevant as financial statements are a communtcatlon
device for reporting economic reality affecting firms and In essence, finance lease is a
financing method for lessees to use the leased assets over most of their useful lives
(McGregor, 1985).
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financial statements comparable across ftnns and adequately disclose lessees• finance
lease exposures (Harris. 1983). Moreover. there ls ample evtde1u:e in the literature to
indicate that footnote disclosure ls adequate for users' decision making (Abdel-khallk.
Ajinknya & McKeown. 1981a; Bowman, 1980; Finnerty. Fitzsimmons & Oliver. 1980;
Houghton, 1984; Lawrence & Bear, 1986; Murray, 1982, Wilkins & Z.tmmer, 1983a). This
argument is further supported by the lack of evidence of a markec re......�i,m to the
announcement of lease capitalization due to the availability of the information
concerning lease commitments in the notes of the financial statements (Martin,
Anderson & Keown. 1979).

Another argument against capitalization of finance leases is the possible
de1etertous effects of capitalization on commonly used accounting ratios and likely effect
of this on debt restrictions under trust deeds (Campbell. 199 l: Harris, 1983: Stevenson,
1985; Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). l l The thrust for this argument is that capitalization of
finance leases would be costly in terms of renegotiation and/or default costs for lessees.
Moreover, it is argued that leasing is a product brought by the demand from small and
medium sized firms to specifically keep leasing off-balance sheet (Wise & Wise, 1985).

The third argument against capitalizing finance leases is the direct and indirect
costs, other than those highlighted in the preceding paragraph. associated with the
requirements of AAS 17. First, the additional bookkeeping and auditing costs because of
the differences between accounting and tax treatment of leases (Long, 1985). The second
argument relates to other costs to redraft lease agreements to avoid being construed as
finance leases (Abdel-khalik, 1981: Imhoff & Thomas, 1988: Whittred & Zimmer, 1992).

lI

Whilst this effect is true. tt is also an argument supporting the move to make certain
leases, le.. finance lease, to be on-balance sheet to properly reflect the economic
substance of lessees. Nevertheless, the inclusion of transitional provtston In AAS 17
was to remedy this possible adverse effect on lessees (McGregor, 1985: Whtttred &
Zimmer, 1992).
20

S1111l1Dary

11-Js chapter discussed at some length the history and nature of the accounting
and reporting of finance lease transactions in Australia. This was followed by a
discussion on the debate whether or not finance leases should be capitalized or
disclosed in the footnotes of lessees' published financial statements. This discussion is
supported with empirical evidence where available. The inference that can be drawn is
that capitalization of finance leases is consistent with the objective of reporting the
economic reality of a firm. Furthermore. the discussion demonstrates that capitalization
of finance leases has economic consequences because it affects users' economic decision
making process which used the accounting numbers that are altered by capitalization.
In the next chapter. a review of selected similar studies is presented, which will
subsequently aid in the development of a theoretical framework and hypotheses
formulation of this study.
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CHAPTERS
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction

This chapter examines the motivations for firms to voluntarily adopt early the
provisions of specific accounting standards during the transitional (or phase-in) period
as allowed in these standards. Generally. the decision to either adopt early or defer
adoption of the requirements of an accounting standard can be construed as a decision
to choose between income increasing or income decreasing accounting policy. This
decision also has balance sheet tmplicat!ons: affecting firm's liquidity ratios and
financial and stabiUty ratios. This chapter is dedicated to the critical evaluation of the
(1) theoretical frameworks. (2) hypotheses, and (3) methodologies employed in selected
published studies similar to this study. The selected studies that are reviewed in this
chapter are summarised and tabulated in Table I . The objective of this literature review
is to identify any refinements and improvements in the three preceding aspects that
could be incorporated into this study.

Accounting policy choice studies

In 1975, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of
Finwicial Accounting Standards {SFAS) No. 8 "Accounting for the Translatton of Foreign
Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial Statements". Due to the adverse
reaction to SFAS No. 8. the FASB issued SFAS No, 52 "Foreign Currency Translation" in
December 1981. Under the new rules, the translation adjustments of many foreign
entities are made directly to shareholders' funds on the balance sheet instead of being
included in net income. Generally. SFAS 52 requirement is an income increasing
accounting policy, where firms switched from SFAS 8 to SFAS 52 (Ayres. 1986). SFAS 52

22

Table 1
Accountlnl Polley Choice studies (Adoption Purine Phase-in Period)

Autllon (Year)

Accounting Std

Benjamin. Grossman SFAS52 Foreign currency
translation
and Wtggtns (1986)

Objective

PriDcljil fl»dtna•

To examine the impact of the adoption of
SFAS 52 during the optional three-year
adoption period (1981 - 1983).

Results suggest that early adoptton of SFAS
52 for many firms was mottvated by a
favourable impact on the financial
statements {I.e., income and EPS).

Senteney and
Strawser (1990)

SFAS 87 Pension
Accounting

To determine whether managements'
decisions to adopt SFAS 87 prior to
mandatory date Is Influenced by its
financial statement effects.

Evidence indicates that the timing of
managements' adoption of SFAS may be
influenced by its financial statement effects.

Wilk.ins and Mok
(1991)

AAS 17 Accounting for
Leases

To detennine the economic factors
motivating management choice of lease
capitalization or footnote disclosure only
accounting method during the first year of
phase-In period (I.e., 1985).

Results Indicate that management chose
financial lease Ccapttallzation tn 1985 With
the View of maxilnlslng near term profits and
m1nim1sing accounting measures of
financial risk.

Samf and Welsh
(1992)

SFAS 87 Pension
Accounting

To investigate whether management's
voluntary choice to adopt the provtsions
of SFAS 87 earlier than required is
associated with factors Influencing
man�er's economic incentives.

Early adopters were more frequently subject
to accounting-based debt constraints:
related to stzc, funding status. and
ownership control.
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also containS a provision which allowed firms to adopt its requirement early during the

three-year phase-in period from 1981 to 1983.
Against the preceding background, Benjamin, Grossman and Wiggins (1986)
examined the financial impact of the adoption of SFAS 52 during the phase-in period.
There are lb:1itattons 1n this study. Benjamin et al. offered no theoretical foundation or
propositions ,.m why firms changed from SFAS 8 to SFAS �:.'- or why firms adopted the
rules of SFAS 52 in each year. Furthermore, no compartsc;n was made to any Mcontrol"
group of firms, i.e., firms that did not change or adopt SFAS 52 in the phase-in period.
The implication of these limitations is that this study is descriptive rather than a
positive accounting theory study. Economic consequences literature suggests that
voluntary or early adoption of new accounting standards are influenced by not only the
associated financial effects but also by agency and political variables (e.g.. see Ayres
(1986), Sarni and Welsh (1992) and Scott (1991).

Apart from SFAS 52. the FASB had issued another accounting pronouncement
which allowed firms to choose the compliance date between the standard's operative
date and its mandatory date. This standard. SFAS 87 "Employers· Accounting for
Pensions". was issued and became operative in December 1985. However, firms had two
calender years before it became mandatory. Although there was widesrread opposition
to SFAS 87. a number of firms adopted the standard earlier than required (Sarni &
Welsh. 1992). Early adoption could be attributed to the hypothesised favourable balance
sheet and income statements effects of adoption of SFAS 87 (Ali & Kumar. 1994).

Senteney and Strawser (1990) employed an approach which was an improvement
on the approach used by Benjamin et al. (1986). In attempting to determine whether
management's decision to adopt SFAS 87 prior to the mandatory date was influenced by
financial statements effects, they tested the firm's leverage and size as possiblr
explanatory factors. In addition, they employed a between group experimental design
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whereby their sample was divided into a treabnent group (i.e., firms adopted early) and a
control group (i.e., firms that did not adopt early). This design IB a better design in terms
of internal validity than the single group design employed by Benjamin et al. (1986).12

Senteney and Strawser ( 1990) inferred from their evtdence that the timing of
management's adoption of SFAS 87 might be influenced by tts financial statements
effects. This was an inconclusive inference because only one of three financial
statements variables tested in their study was significant. However. they offered no
suggestions as to what could be the possible underlying motive for management to
adopt SFAS 87 during the transitional period. This query remains further unanswered
because both of the other finn specific characteristics. i.e.. firm size and leverage, were
not statistically significant. Moreover. the result of the size variable was contrary to the
political cost hypothesis; it was positively associated with adoption of SFAS 87 - an
income increasing accounting policy.

There are other limitations of the study by Senteney and Strawser ( 1990). They
failed to test for any differences in the characteristics of firms that adopted and did not
adopt SFAS 87 in the first and third year of the phase-in period. They only tested for
differences between the groups sampled In 1986. i.e .. the second year of the phase-in
period. No explanation was offered for this approach taken. With regard to the statistical
tests employed, they did not offer any reason(s) for performing both univariate and
multivariate tests. In addition, prior to performing the multivariate analysis. there was
no indication of testing for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The
presence of harmful multicollinearity could cause the results of the multivariate
regression to be unstable (Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980; Fox, 1991).

12

Sekaran (1992) asserts that a single treatment group design, as used by Benjamin et al.
(1986), has "no scientific value in determining cause-effect relationships.· (p.136).

25

Sami and Welsh (1992) extended the earlier study by Senteney and Strawser
(1990) by incorporating a number of Improvements in certain areas.13 First, Sami and
Welsh provided a strong theoretical framework in developing ntne testable hypotheses,
includJng several hypotheses that were not tested in the earlier two studies. This
theoretical framework was based on the agency and political cost literature, which has
been established and well tested in previous other accounting policy choice studies. A
major Improvement was that. rather than relying on accounting ratio proxies, they used
actual provisions of debt contracts in developing their debt constraints variabl•!S.

Even though Sarni and Welsh (1992) was a significant improvement over the two
earlier studies, certain aspects of their study should be noted as limitations. First, their
sample consisted of firms in 1985 and 1986, which were grouped as adopters and non
adopters. They left out firms that adopted or did not a�r,pt SFAS 87 in the final year of
the phase-in period of 1987. No explanation was offered for the approach taken. Second,
the sample of firms were matchPd according to their industry classifications. Accordingly.
subsequent statistical tests were. matched-pairs tests. controlling for possible industry
effects. However. if industry matched-pairs testing design was considered appropriate as
purported by the authors. why not match the sample for other potentially significant
factors including firm age, size. and capital structure.

Notwithstanding the limitations. many of the improvements incorporated by
Sarni and Welsh (1992) could also be incorporated in this study. For example, certain
variables employed by Sarni and Welsh could also be used and testP.d tn the Australian
environment; second. a pooled cross-sectional test of the sample as performed by Sarni
and Welsh could be made. This method aims to validate the findings of separate cross
sectional testing over the whole phase-in period.

13

A major difference between these studies Is their objective. While Senteney and
Strawser (1990) hypothesised that the financial statement effects of SFAS 87 influenced
management's decision to adopt/not adopt, Sarni and Welsh (1992} hypothesised that
the decision was influenced by managers' economic incentives.

26

The study by Wilkins and Mok (1991) is of great interest and relevance to this
study. The current study is an extension and refinement, attempting to overcome the
limitations identified in the preceding three studies and also the limitations in Wilkins
and Mok.

A major limitation identified in Wilkins and Mok (1991) ts that a majority of their
hypotheses were developed based on the preliminary evidence derived from the reporting
sample of their study. They found that capitalization of fmance lease commitments of
the sampled listed lessee firms generally resulted in an increase in income from the
capitalization. This is contrary to the expectation suggested by the literature that
capitalization of finance leases would generally be an income decreasing policy. at least
in the year of adoption. Le .. the first year of capitalization (Abdel-khalik. 1981; Ashton.
1985; El-Gazaar. Lilien & Pastena. 1986; Whittred & Zimmer, 1992).14 The reliance on
this preliminary evidence contributed to the development of hypotheses that were
contradictory from the contracting theory perspective. For example. based on the general
expectation that capitalization of finance lease is an accounting policy with negative
effects on the balance sheet and Income statement. contracting literature predicts that
low-leveraged firms and firms with high inten

·t

coverage ratios would more likely

capitalize their finance lease commitments; however. Wilkins and Mok hypothesised
that low-leveraged firms and firms with lower interest coverage ratios would be more
inclined to capitalize their finance lease commitments.

The other potential limitations in tJ, e study by Wilkins and Mok ( 1991) are as
follows. First, they did not attempt to test political cost variables as possible explanatory
variables in their study. apart from the firm size variable, which could proxy for factors
other than firm's political visibility. Other potential political visibility proxies include
social responsibility disclosure, press coverage, taxation burden, and market
14

However, the actual Income effect of capitalization on individual lessee firm depends on
factors including the age of the leased asset, Its estimated useful life, and its implicit
interest rate.
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concentration (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Panchapakesan & McKinnon, 1992). In
addition, they did not extend their sample to include lessee firms that
capitalized/footnote disclosed their finance lease commitments in the other two years of
the transitional period. It is an empirical question as to whether their findings would
hold for the remaining two years of the transitional period. This is because there are
plausible reasons why certain lessees might adopt capitalization in year 2 (or year 3) but
chose not

to in year 1 (or year 2). Firstly, these lessees were newly listed firms on the

stock exchange in the relevant year. Secondly. these lessees, with certain motives, timed
their adoption of AAS 17 to tl1elr advantage.

Summary

From the preceding analysis of the selected studies of a similar nature, there is a
need for a stronger theoretical framework that would help in developing better testable
hypotheses to explain management's decision to either capitalize or to disclose via
footnote disclosure their finance lease commitments. Furthermore. there are possible
improvements in the areas of research method and design that could be incorporated in
this study. The following Chapter 4 develops the theoretical linkages that certain firm
specific variables have to a decision to either capitalize finance lease commitments or
disclose such commitments in the footnotes of the financial statements. Chapter 5
elaborates on the research method and design employed in this study.
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CBAPTER4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
BYPOTBESES FORMULATION

IDtroductlon

This chapter proceeds with a discussion of the theoretical framework underlying
this study. This followed by a short discussion on the effects of capitalization of finance
leases on lessees' financial statements. Finally. this chapter deltberates on the
formulation of the research hypotheses which are tested in this study.

Theoretical framework

According to Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), accounting choices (as in this
case, the lessees' choice of either capitalization or footnote disclosure of finance lease
commitments) have economic consequences if changes in the rules used to calculate
accounting numbers alter the distribution of firms· cash flows, or the wealth of parties
who use those numbers for decision making. 15 Based on the extant literature, it is a
logical inference that economic consequences are driven by contracting and monitoring
costs (Holthausen & Leftwich. 1983). and signalling costs (Morris, 1987).16 Thus. the
economic consequence of accounting policy choice is driven by contracting theory and
signalling theory. The former is also associated with agency theory and political cost
theory. This economic consequence theoretical framework is represented
diagrammatically In Figure 1. The following two sections elaborate the components of
this theoretical framework. the contracting theory and the signalling theory.

15

It has been established, in chapter 2, that the requirements of AAS 17 to capitalize
finance leases do have economic consequences. The economic consequence ls not in
terms of affecting the firm's cash flows, but that capitalization of finance leases affect
users· economic decision making processes.

16

Morris {1987) demonstrates that agency theory and signalling theory seems to be
competing theories, but In essence, they are consistent.
29

Coatractma them,

According to Holthausen (1990), there are three alternative perspectives on
accounting policy choice. They are opportunistic behavtor, information, and efficient
contracting perspectives. Opportunistic behavtor (or opportunism) assumes that
managers choose income increasing accounting policies that maximize their own
compensation at the expense of shareholders (Christle & Zimmerman, 1994;
Holthausen, 1990) .17 From the information perspective, the choice of accounting
policies reveals information about the future cash flows of the firms {Holthausen, 1990).
In this study, opportunism and information perspectives are not applicable because of
the following reasons. First, since lease capitalization has an income decreasing effect in
the year of adoption, i.e.. the first year of capitalization (Abdel-khalik. 1981; El-Gazaar et
al., 1986; Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). it is an unlikely opportunistic accounting policy.18
Second, lease capitalization does not affect lessee firms' cash flows because it is only a
re-packaging of information (Abdel-khalik. 1981) and consequently, it is not an
accounting policy that proVides additional information about managers' expectation of
firms future cash flows. Hence, in this study, efficient contracting is assumed to be the
general premise underlying the economic consequences of lease capitalization
accounting policy choice.

Accounting research based on the efficient contracting perspective examines the
incentives to choose among alternative accounting methods because of the explicit and
implicit contracts that rely on accounting numbers (Holthausen, 1990). Examples of the
contractual agreements include lending agreements, management compensation plans,
and firms' management/control structure. The efficient contracting perspective, with
respect to accounting policy choice, hypothesises ti1at accounting methods will be
17

For fuller discussion on contracting theory see, for example, Fama (1980), Holthausen
and Leftwich (1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1986 &
1990).

18

see earlier footnote no. 14.
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selected to mtnimtse agency costs and/or political costs amongst the various parties to
the firm (including managers, shareholders, debtbolders, unions, politicians, and
bureaucrats). Christle and Zimmerman (1994) also contend that "efficiency assumes
accounting procedures facilitate internal declslon making and control, mln1mize taxes,
reduce costly bond renegotiations, and minimize the costs of expected opportunism" (p.
562). Thus, the end result is maximizing the value of the firm (Christie & Zimmerman,
1994: Holthausen, 1990).

These agency costs and political costs arise because of the conflict of interest
between managers and shareholders, between managers (acting on behalf of
shareholders) and debtholders. and between managers (on behalf of shareholders and
debtholders), and politicians, bureaucrats. consumers and unions. in which a. decision
made may serve the interest of one party but may not necessarily be in the best interest
of the other party or parties. There are ample examples in the literature of accounting
policy choice studies. in particular studies of single procedure choice, which have tested
and found support to the various hypotheses dertved from efficient contracting theory
including Zimmer (1986). Whittred (1987). Malmquist (1990). and Mian and Smith
(1990).

Signalling theory

Signalling theory addresses the problem of information asymmetry in the
markets, where the seller of goods or services know their quality but the buyer does
not.19 In the economic environment where there is separation between control /
management and ownership, information asymmetry exists between managers and
external parties to the firms including shareholders, lenders. unions, politicians, and
regulators. Managers are assumed to possess superior knowledge about their firms'
19

For extensive discussion on signalling theory and Its application In accountlng/finance
area, see, for example, Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984), Downes and Heinke! (1982), John
and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Morris (1987) and Ross (1977).
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future cash flows. Thus, the incentive to signal by accounting policy selection should be
highest where tnfonnatton asymmetty is greatest (Morris, 1987).

In the situation of tnfonnatlon asymmetry and 1n the absence of an appropriate
signal of quality, buyers (i.e., the external parties to the firms) will price all firms at the
average price. These costs of information asymmetry are borne by the manager of an
above average quality flnn. The manager then has an incentive to signal his/her firm's
above average quality to reduce this opportunity loss. In order to enable the buyers to
differentiate between high and low quality firms, the managers will engage 1n appropriate
quality signalling {for example, by adopting the "best" accounting and reporting policies
recommended by the accounting profession). This is crucial if managers believe in the
importance of users' perception towards the firms in their economic decision making
(Abdel-kha:.k. 1981). The outcome would be that the buyers are then able to price the
high and low quality firms differently based on the signals provided by these firms'
managers. Thus, maximization of the value of the firms is achieved.

The preceding discussion illustrates the applicability of signalling theory in
accounting policy choice. to explain and predict management's choice of alternative
accounting methods. Morris ( 1987) reached a conclusion. based on his comparative
analysis of agency theory and signalling theory. that both theories "are consistent ... a
considerable overlap exists between them" (p. 53). Thus, a combined signalling and
efficient contracting theory may yield further insights into choice of accounting
methods. "not obtainable from either theory alone" (p. 53).
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:npre 1

Economic Consequences

Contracting and
monitoring cost

Signalling cost

-----. .-------

Agency cost

20

Political cost

Figure 1 is adopted from Mangos (1991) with modlftcattons.

Bn,otheaea formulation

The following sections discuss the formulation of each research hypothesis that
will be tested in this study. These hypotheses are developed from the efficient contracting
and signalling perspectives With the following general premise: The objective of the firms'
decisions to capitalize finance leases is to mitigate the agency/political costs incurred by
these firms, and to signal as being high quality firms to the users' of published financial
statements. This accounting policy choice has the implication of maximizing the value
of the flnn (Holthausen. 1990).

The research hypotheses are formulated in the uni-directional form. This is made
possible because of the general expected effect of finance lease capitalization on lessees'
balance sheet and income statement. Since capitalization means the recognition of a
finance lease as both an asset and a liability, the balance sheet would reflect much
higher gearing (Ashton. 1985; El-Gazaar et al., 1986: Whittred & Zimmer, 1992).
Capitalization of leases also has the potential to adversely affect lessees' reported
income. There is a consensus in the literature that lease capitalization shifts or defers
income to hter years: It is an income-decreasing accounting policy choice in the year of
adoption. i.e.. the first year of capitalization (Ashton. 1985: EI-Gazaar et al., 1986;
Whittred & Zimmer, 1992).21

Corporate control structure

There is evidence in the contracting literature indicating a firm's choice of
accounting method is systematically different depending upon its corporate control
structure (Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Whittred, 1987). From an efficient contracting
perspective. it is hypothesised that management-controlled firms (hereafter called MC
firms) have greater incentives
21

to choose capitalization of finance lease accounting policy

see earlier footnote no. 14.

34

than owner-controlled firms (hereafter called OC firms). The following arguments support
this corporate control structure hypothesis.

The basic characteristic of MC firms is the greater separation between
management / control and ownership. This gives rise to greater agency costs for MC
firms due to the asymmetric information and costly monitoring of managers'
performance. This situation also serves as a possibility for managers of MC firms to
behave opportunistically. As a response, the outside shareholders price protect22
themselves and implement a mechanism that would entice managers to make economic
decisions in the owners' best interest. One of the most common mechanism is a
management compensation plan, which is normally a function of reported income (Antle
& Smith, 1986; Lambert, Larcker & Baker, 1987). These responses are considered
necessary in order to reduce the costs of expected opportunism by the managers.

Since rational outside shareholders are price protected, managers of MC firms
have greater incentives to select accounting policies that minimize the costs of expected
opportunism. This type of response suggest that managers of MC firms select particular
accounting policies for efficiency purposes. As capitalization of finance leases reduces
income in the year of adoption. I.e .. the first year of capitalization, it consequently
minimizes the costs of expected opportunism, Managers of MC firms are more likely to
capitalize finance lease commitments than managers of OC firms.23

The corporate control structure hypothesis based on signalling theory produces a
similar prediction to that of efficient contracting theory. It is hypothesised that MC firms
are more likely to capitalize finance lease than OC firms. There are two lines of argument
22

Price protect refers to the action where Mthe outside debt- and share-holders discount
the price they are willing to pay for their claims for any expected managerial actions
that reduce their future returns.· (Christle & Zimmerman, 1994 p. 541).

23

However, since capitalization defers Income to later years (Ashton 1985, El-Gazaar et
al.. 1986), the managers' compensation on average and over a number of periods may
not be adversely affected. This may however, suggest some form of opportunism.
Nevertheless, in the year of adoption the decision to capitalize ftnancc leases ts based
on efficiency reason.
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in support of this proposition. First, in a situation where there is greater information
asymmetry between managers and interested external parties, including owners and
debtholders, as in the case of MC firms, there is a greater incentive for such firms to
signal by adopting appropriate recommended accounting policy to mitigate opportunity
loss. This action can also be construed as a bonding mechanism by the managers of
lessee firms. Second, the adoption of finance lease capitalization, a method deemed
appropriate and relevant by the profession, is a signal to the market indicating that
these firms are not using the alternative method (i.e.. footnote disclosure) to mislead
interested external parties. As determined earlier. capitalization of finance leases better
reflects a flnn's economic substance.

By way of contrast. OC firms will be less inclined to engage in this capitalization
of finance lease signal. This is because owners in OC firms have the ability to exert a
direct influence on the behaviour of managers. consequently managers in OC firms have
considerably less discretionary power. Thus. based on signalling theory, it is more likely
that MC firms rather than OC firms will capitalize finance leases.

There are consistent predictions between efficient contracting theory and
signalling theory concerning the corporate control structure hypothesis in reference to
the choice of either capitalization or footnote disclosure only for finance leases. Thus.
hypothesis H 1 is formulated as follows.

HI:

Management-controlled firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than
owner-controlled firms.

Debt contracting

The debt/equity hypothesis. as expounded In the contracting literature, predicts
that firms with large amounts of debt relative to equity in their capital structure will
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tend

to choose accounting methods which result in higher,

or earlier reported income

and oppose mandatory changes in accounting methods which would reduce, or delay
the reporting of income (Watts & Zimmerman. 1986 and 1990). This implies that
managers of firms with a high level of leverage are more likely to engage in opportunism.
This ls because asymmetric information and costly monitoring prevent outside
debtholders from perfectly monitoring managers (Christle & Zimmennan, 1994).

In order to protect their interests, outside debtholders price protect themselves
and implement a mechanism of restrictive covenants which are present in most debt
issues, private and public. These restrictive covenants are put in place to prevent wealth
transfers away from debtholders to equityholders, indicating a positive relationship
between leverage and agency costs of debt (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Since the
provisions contained in these covenants such as leverage and interest coverage are
usually defined with reference to generally accepted accounting principles, a lessee could
be in technical default if it capitalized its finance lease rather than disclosed them in the
footnotes of their financial statements. This is because lease capitalization is likely to
increase leverage ratios (Abdel-khalik. I 981: Ashton, 1985; El-Gazaar et al., 1986;
Whittred & Zimmer, 1992). Furthermore. it has been found that borrowers perceive debt
covenants as a more important factor than compensation contracts and political
environment in their accounting policy choices (Gopalakrishnan & Parkash. 1995).

Thus, from an efficient contracting perspective, capitalization of finance lease
commitments by firms with low leverage ratios is an accounting policy that promotes
efficiency in monitoring and bonding. This is a plausible argument because of the
following reasons. First, low leveraged lessee firms are those firms that have greater
capacity to increase debt to the extent that they are further away from the need to
renegotiate their debt covenants brought about by the increase in debt

through

capitalization of finance leases. Second, since capitalization of finance leases shows the
economic substance of the firms' overall debt obligations, it consequently facilitates
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internal decision making and control. Finally, as capitalization also reduces income in
the year of adoption, It also minlm17.es the costs of expected opportunism by managers.
Thus, from an efficient contracting perspective, lessee firms with low leverage ratios are
more likely to capitalize their finance lease commitments than firms with high leverage
ratios.

According to signalling theory, managers have an incentive to offer restrictive
debt covenants to maximise the price at which debt is sold, and "indirectly to act as a
signal about expected future earnings and expected levels of management
compensation." (Morris, 1987 p. 51). Hence, firms with higher contractual leverage ratios
have above average expected values, and arguably are above average quality when
compared to firms with lower contractual leverage ratios. However. firms With leverage
ratios nearing their contractual level may also be signalling the managers' inefficiency in
managing the firms' resources. In addition, since capitalization of finance lease is the
method advocated by the profession because it better reflects firms' true economic
substance, high quality firms with low leverage ratios have greater incentives to
capitalize their finance leases in order to differentiate them from lower qhality firms.
Thus. It is hypothesised that low leveraged firms are more likely than high leveraged
firms to capitalize finance leases.

An ideal research design to test this hypothesis is to measure the spread between
each firm's maximum contractual leverage ratio and its prevailing leverage ratio.
However, this information is not readily available. Nevertheless, evidence from Duke and
Hunt (1990), and Press and Weintrop (1990) indicate that leverage ratios are correlated
with closeness to actua 1 debt covenant constraints, and therefore are good proxies for
tightness of debt covenant constraints. Thus. consistent With efficient contracting
theory and signalling theory, the debt contracting hypothesis is stated as follows:
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H2:

Low leveraged firms are more likely

to capitalize finance leases than high

leveraged firms.

In the context of this study, the firm size construct is not used to measure a
firm's political visibility. Rather. firm size is a variable to proxy for a firm's information
production costs (Ball & Foster, 1982; Firth, 1979). This hypothesis predicts that if
information production costs related to certain accounting policy are high, then large
firms are more likely to have the resources necessary to select such accounting policy. In
the case of finance lease capitalization, it is considered that the information production
costs are not trivial. These costs include the following.

First. certain costs are incurred to assess the impact of capitalization on lessees
financial statements. For example. there are the debt contracting costs associated with
disclosures of increased debt. This includes the potential costs of renegotiation of debt
agreements and / or the potential increase in costs of new debts to be raised. Second,
additional bookkeeping costs associated with a new reporting system that differs from
tax requirements (Whittred & Zimmer. 1992). Last but certainly not least, costs of
training and education to enable preparers of financial statements to be familiar and
competent with the capitalization requirement and related concepts, for example.
implicit interest rates, present value of future obligations. and fair values (I-Iarris, 1983).

Apart from the information production costs incurred, the potential benefits for
large lessee firms to capitalize their finance lease commitments include the following.
First, since capitalization reflects the true economic substance of the lessees' assets base
and debt obligations. internal decision making and control would be facilitated. Second,
as large firms tend to be firms that are complex (Abdel-khalik, 1995) and difficult to
monitor, managers of these firms have greater incentives to select income decreasing /
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deferral accounting policy, for example capitalization of finance leases,

to mfnimize the

costs of expected opportunism.

Hence, from

an efficient contracting perspective, it is hypothesised that Jarger

lessee firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than smaller lessee firms. This is
consistent with the prediction derived from signalling theory. It Is conceivable that larger
firms also tend to be high quality firms. This is supported by the argument that a firm
�ets larger (as measured by its revenue or assets or profits) because of its success 1n the
market, which in tum depends on the market's perception of the firm's quality. In order
to reinforce the market perception that they are high quality firms, larger lessee firms
continue to engage in appropriate signalling. ln the context of this study, the signal
selected by larger lessee firms is the capitalization of finance leases. Recall that
capitalization reduces the alternative methods for reporting a lease transaction, provides
a better reflection of lessees· economic substance and hence gives the impression of
attempts not to mislead the market.

Choi (1989). Firth (1979). Sami and Welsh (1992). and Singhvi and Desai (1971)
have found firm size, as a prox-y for firms· information production costs. to be a
significant explanatory variable in their respec�ive investigations. Thus, based on the
preceding arguments and empirical evidence from the ilterat ...1re. H3 is formulated as
follows.

H3:

Larger firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than smaller ftrms.

Political visibility

Political visibility (also referred to as politically sensitive or vulnerable) refers to
the situation whereby a firm attracts a disproportionate share of scrutiny by the
government and Its regulatory agencies or other interest groups (Including the general
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public and trade unions), making it a potential target for the imposition of political
costs. Political costs are the wealth redistributions away from the firm to the government
and other sectors of its industry or the economy. The redistribution of wealth is
normally effected through among others, the Imposition of taxes, removal of subsidies
and licences, granting of wage increases, and restrictions on firm's activities. Financial
statements are a source of information used by interested parties in singling out firms
for wealth transfers. However, the extent to which these devices rely on accounting
based data varies widely. There is a consensus in the literature that firms' political
visibility is positively related With their reported income (Watts. 1977: Watts &
Zimmerman. 1986: Whittred & Zimmer, 1992: Wong. 1988a and 1988b). The political
costs hypothesis predicts that politically visible firms are more likely to select accounting
methods which result in lower. or delay reported income (Watts & Zimmerman. 1986 and
1990). Thus. from an efficient contracting perspective. it is hypothesised that since
capitalization of finance leases results in lower reported income (which consequently
minimizes the expected wealth transfers affected by the regulators and thereby protects
the outside claimholders' interests). lessee firms \vith higher political visibility are more
likely to capitalize finance leases than lessee firms \vith lower political visibility during
the phase-in period.24

The preceding political cost hypothesis is consistent \vith the prediction derived
from signalling theory. A firm's level of political visibility is an incentive for such firm to
engage in appropriate signalling to indicate their expected level of quality. As political
visibility is a function of reported income. it is a fair assumption that politically Visible
firms. due to the high level of reported income, are also high quality firms. Prior to
introduction of MS 17. lessees had alternative methods for disclosing their lease
transactions. With the availability of such flexibility, firms have the tendency to choose
the alternative that reports the firms' performance in the most fa:vourable way. This
24

The literature on single procedure accounting choice reveals empirical evidence which
supports the political costs hypothesis (Bowen et al .. 1981: Daley & Vlgeland, i.983;
Dhaliwal et al.. 1982).
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arguably could mean that such firms are engaging in creative accounting to mislead
interested external parties However, this action would result in adverse selection
because there is no way for users' of financial statements to differentiate between high
and low quality firms (Morns, 1987}.

The early adoption of capitalization of finance leases during the phase-in period
is a positive signal indicating a firm is relinquishing the flexibility to disclose lease
transactions. At the same time, the signal is indicating to external parties that the firm
is adopting an accounting practice advocated by the profession which will better reflect
its economic substance. Thus, in an attempt to differentiate high and low quality firms,
politically visible firms have greater incentive to capitalize finance leases during the
phase-in period.

H4:

Firms with higher political visibility are more likely to capitalize finance leases
than firms with lower political visibility.

The level of press coverage Is used to measure firms· political visibility is . This is
considered to be an appropriate construct because of "an expectation that firms that are
constantly in the media spotlight are more susceptible to political !wealth] transfers
than firms that rarely receive media attention" (Deegan & Carroll, 1993 p. 223}. Thus,
the level of press coverage (a component of the media) encapsulates Nthe media's
perception of the aggregate political visibility of a firm arising from one or a combination
of specific sources" (Panchapakesan & McKinnon, 1992 p. 75).25 Empirical evidence
supports the contention of a strong link between the level of press coverage and political
visibility (Panchapakesan & McKinnon. 1992), and between press coverage and firm size
(Laswad. 1991).
25

Panchapakesan and McKinnon ( 1992) argue that "ff a firm comes under governmental
or interest group scrutiny because of speclflc circumstances such as, for example, the
industry it operates, the working and pay conditions of Its employees, or the market
position it occupies, the press and media will devote proportionately more space to the
firm ... that attract public attention: (p. 75).
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PlnaDclal performance

The bonus plan hypothesis has been extensively tested in numerous accounting
policy choice studies in the USA (Abdel-khalik, 1985; Ayres, 1986: Bowen et al•• 1981:
El-Gazaar et al•• 1986; Scott, 1991). This hypothesis predicts that managers of firms
with management compensation plans tied to reported income are more likely to choose
accounting methods that report higher or earlier income.26 This hypothesis has been
thoroughly tested 1n the USA because the information relating to the plans parameters
are publicly available. This is not the case for Australia (Wilkins & Mok, 1991; Whittred
& Chan. 1992; Zimmer, 1986), and as result a direct test of the bonus plans hypothesis
has not been employed in Australian accounting policy choice studies. However, a
review of the literature has revealed that most Australian commercial organisations have
instituted bonus schemes tied to reported income or other performance indicators
including

return

on

equity

(ROE)

and

return

on

assets

(ROA),

into

management/executive compensation plans (Deegan. 1994: Klinedinst, 1991;
Lawriwsky. 1982; Smith & Watts, 1982; Watt. 1988).

Nevertheless. even in the absence of explicit Income-based bonus plans,
management may have an incentive to mitigate decreases in the level of reported income
(Christle & Zimmerman. 1994; Sarni & Welsh, 1992; Trombley, 1989). The primary reason
for this is that poor performance relative to the preceding year may lead to termination,
whereas improved performance can justify requests for increased compensation. Since
capitalization of finance leases results in decreased reported income, ceteris pa.ribus, the
incentive to adopt the capitalization method is not uniform across lessee ftnns. Thus,
from an efficient contracting perspective, It Is hypothesised that firms with greater
improved financial performance relative to the preceding year have greater incentive to
capitalize finance leases than firms with smaller improved financial performance relative
26

However. this general hypothesis does not necessarily hold in situation where the
bonus has a ceiling and tt Is near or at maximum level. In this situation, managers are
more likely to defer income to the next reporting period (Healy, 1985).
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to the preceding year. This hypothesis is supported by the argument that since
capitalization reduces income in the year of adoption, it consequently mlnimizes the
costs of expected opportunism by managers. Furthermore, capitalization of finance
leases accounting policy also facilitates efficiency in monitoring and bonding managers'
behavtor because It better reflects a firm's economic substance.

Signalling theory yields consistent predictions in this aspect. Firms with bigger
growth in income are generally considered as high quality firms due to the fact that
bigger growth results in maximizing the value of the firms. Thus, in order to reinforce
their high quality status, firms With bigger percentage growth in income have greater
incentive to capitalize their finance leases than firms With smaller percentage growth in
income. This is a positive signal because capitalization removes the possibility of flrms to
elect off-balance sheet (footnote) disclosure which gives the impression of attempts to
mislead shareholders and debtholders. By way of contrast. firms with smaller growth in
income (which also means low quality firms) do not have the same incentive to
capitalize their finance leases. This is because capitalization results in lower reported
income which In tum reinforces the perception of users of financial statements as being
low quality firms. Thus. hypothesis H5 Is stated as follows.

H5:

Finns With bigger percentage growth In pre-adoption income are more likely to
capitalize finance leases than firms with smaller percentage growth in pre
adoption income.

Overseas association

A lessee is considered to have an overseas association if it is either (1) a
subsidiary of a foreign parent in Canada or the UK or the USA, or (2) where its shares
are simultaneously listed in Canada or the UK or the USA. It is hypothesised that firms
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with either one or both of these characteristics are more likely to capitalize finance
leases during the phase-in period. An in-depth discussion of this hypothesis follows.

First, Australian subsidiaries of foreign parents in Canada, the UK or the USA.
where finance lease capitalization policy is already fully 1n force, are likely to adopt the
same practices of their parents (Bazley et al., 1985; Gay, Farley & Peirson, 1993).
Assuming these foreign parents are capitalizing their finance leases, it is hypothesised
that their subsidiaries 1n Australia are more likely to capitalize their finance leases.27
This uniform practice of accounting for finance leases would facilitate the consolidation
of financial statements by the parents. and at the same time allow comparability of
performance between subsidiaries in Australia and in the home country.

Second, Australian lessee firms that are also listed in countries (Canada. the UK
and the USA) where capitalization of finance leases is mandatory have greater incentive
to follow suit and capitalize their finance leases. This is because the additional costs to
account for and to report capitalized finance leases have already been incurred in
complying with the overseas listing requirements (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman,
1981). In addition. these lessee firms have the necessary eJ1.--perience. which makes them
more likely to capitalize finance leases early.

The benefit accruing to firms with an overseas association that adopt the
capitalization of l.nance leases is in terms of the favourable perception by external
parties, including Australian investors. analysts, and regulators. This would result in
lower agency costs and lower political co�ts. Thus. for lessee firms with an overseas
association, capitalization of finance leases promotes efficiency in monitoring managers'
performance. In addition, since these lessee firms are complying with the "best" practice
advocated by the accounting profession, this action can be construed as signalling to
27

It Is assumed here that since the finance lease capitalization requirement has become
mandatory in these countries, there ts no reason to believe that lessees in these
countries are not complying with this requirement.
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the market that they are not endeavouring to mislead external parties. Consequently. it
is an indication that they are high quality ftrms.

Recent empidcal studies have reported findings in support of the components of
this hypothesis. Cooke (1991), Malone. Fries and Jones, (1993), Meek and Gray (1989).
and Saudagaran and Biddle ( 1992) have found evidence suggesting a positive
relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and a firm's listing on foreign stock
exchanges. In addition, studies by Bazley et al. (1985) and Gay et al. (1993) reveal
findings which suggest that a subsidiary relationship is a significant predictor in
managements' decision concerning voluntru:y lease disclosures and presentation of
value-added statements respectively. Thus hypothesis H6 is formulated as follows.

H6:

Firms with an overseas association are more likely to capitalize finance leases
than firms With no overseas association.

Summary

This chapter presented a discussion on the proposed theoretical framework
underlying this study. Subsequently, a set of hypotheses was developed based on the
economic consequences theory (efficient contracting and signalling). It is hypothesised
that lessee firms bearing the characteristics of being ( l} manager-controlled firm. (2) low
leveraged, (3) larger in size, (4) politically visible. (5} positive change in profitability, and
(6) with overseas association. are more likely to capitalize their finance leases during the
phase-in period of AAS 17 so as to reduce their agency and political costs, and also to
signal their status as high quality firms. In the next chapter, matters concerning the
research methodology of this study are expounded. These matters include the
discussions on sample selection. definition of variables, and research design.
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CBAPTBRS
RESEARCH METHOD
Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological aspects of this study. The discussions
are on the following areas: First, the selection of the final reporting sample. Second, the
deftnltlon of relevant dependent and independent variables. Third, the data sources that
will be utilised in the data collection and data analysis stages. Last. the statistical
techniques to be employed.

Sample selection

This study is a cross-sectional study of financial reporting practices of listed
lessee firms' finance lease commitments during the transitional period between 1985 and
1987. Lessees' reported in the Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM)

Annual Reports Microfiche Files (1985, 1986 and 1987) was used as the sample of this
study.28 The sample was subjected to a further sampling phase through which a final
reporting sample was selected after satisfying the sampling criteria.

The sampling design of this study is as follows. Upon inspection of the AGSM
File, Australian lessee firms who adopted AAS 17 (either capitalising or disclosing in the
footnotes their finance leases transactions) in 1985, 1986 and 1987 were identified. The
28

The AGSM File consists of the top 500 listed companies In Australia by market
capitalisation. The AGSM File that was used in this study is housed at the Edith Cowan
University, Churchlands' campus libraty.
This study acknowledges the limitations of the AGSM File. Deegan and Carroll (1993)
note that due to the fact that the AGSM File only consists of the top 500 Australian
listed companies, the results based on this sample may be more specJflc to larger ftrms.
Further, Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) assert that the AGSM File does not include
large private companies, and allowance has not been made for the dlfferent accounting
methods, e.g., depreciation / amortisation policies, used by companies In arriving at
balance sheet and profit and loss figures.
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sample selection ls subjected to the constraint that a lessee firm once identified as a
capitalizer (footnote discloser) in one year could not be selected again as footnote
discloser (capitalizer) In the subsequent year(s). Subsequently, these lessee firms were
classlfled as capitalizer and non-capitalizer (I.e., footnote discloser) across ttme.29 Thus,
the test or treatment group consists of the capitalizers, and the control group is made
up of the non-capitalizers. This sample selection and classlflcation process gives rise to
potential self-selection bias problems which are normally encountered in most
accounting studies tn which firms are not randomly assigned to treatment and control
groups (Foster. 1980; Abdel-khalik, 1990; Rayburn, 1990).30

Deftnltlon of variables

In this section, the definition and the measurement of the relevant dependent
and independent variables are discussed. Table 2 presents the summary of the
descriptions of these variables.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable of the study is the accounting policy choice by the lessees
concerning their finance leases. This choice is captured as a dichotomous dummy
variable. Lessees that capitalized finance leases were given a value of 1, and lessees that
adopted note disclosure of their finance lease transactions were given a value of 0.

29

30

This sample selection process is consistent With the approach taken by Wbittred and
Chan (1992}, but differs slightly whether the process is with or without replacement of
subjects. This Is because, the sample selection process in this study is non-random.
One method for correcting self-selection bias is the employment of "Two-stage switching
regression· (Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Maddala, 1991; Shehata, 1991). However, due to the
unavailability of appropriate factors to be incorporated into the regression analyses,
this study is unable to assess or correct for any such bias.
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Table 2

Pefcdatl9AI of Variablt1
Variables

Deacrlptlou

Pe»endent u,lablc
ADOPI'

(O, l) finance lease accounting choice; footnote
disclosure (O); capitalization (1).

Inde,pendent yarlablel
OCMC(l)

(O, l) owner-controlled (OC) lf one party has more than
10% of voting shares, and exercise active control, or lf
one party has more than 20% of voting shares (0);
otherwise manager-controlled (MC} (1).

DEBT

Total liabilities divtded by total tangible assets

SIZE(l)

Total assets

PRESS

Level of press coverage as cited in the ABI

PERF(l)

Adoption year net income less prior year net income
divtded by prior year net income

OSEAS

(0, 1) no overseas association in terms of foreign parent
relationship. or overseas listing status (O); otherwise
(1).

Financial variables, DEBT, SIZE and PERF. are adjusted to remove the effect of
capitalization of finance leases (see Appendix Cl.
Altematlve pro:z.y

Description

OCMC(2)

Percentage of ordinary shares held by other than the
top 20 shareholders; widely held = MC firm; narrowly
held = OC firm.

SIZE(2)

Total revenue

S1ZE(3)

Net income after tax before extraordinary items

PERF{2)

(O, l) firms with negative change (i.e., decrease in profit
or increase in loss} in net income tax before
extraordinary items (O}; firms with positive change (i.e.,
increase in profit or decrease in loss) (1).
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ladepend.ent ftdabla
Consistent with the number of research hypotheses, there are six Independent
variables tested. Subsequent discussion relates primarily to the main definition and
measurement construct of each variable. 31

(I)

Corporate structure (OCMC)

This variable ls measured by a dichotomous dummy variable {0, 1) with OC firms
were given the value of O. whilst MC firms were given the value of 1. Consistent with the
criteria used by Dhaliwal et al., (1982), firms were classified as OC if one party holds
more than 1OOAI of the voting shares and exercise active control, or if one party hold more
than 20% of the voting shares. Active control Is taken to mean representation on the
Board of Directors or in firm's management (e.g., Managing Director or Chief Executive
Officer). When a firm could not be identified as OC firm, the firm is classified as MC firm
(Whittred, 1987).32

(2)

Debt contracting (DEBT)

Whittred and Zimmer ( 1986) and Stokes and Tay ( 1988) have found that the
most frequently used measurement of leverage In Australian public debt issues is the
ratio of total liabilities (excluding contingent liabilities) divided by total tangible assets.

31

However, this study will also attempt to employ and test alternative measurements as no
single construct can adequately capture or proxy the true dimensions of the
independent variables contained in the disclosure model (Watts & Zimmennan, 1990).
This approach was also taken In order to avoid criticism of arbitrary selection of the
proxies for the various independent variables. These alternative measurement
constructs are provided in the footnote following the definitions of each variable and
also in Table 2.

32

An alternative proxy is the percentage of ordinary shares held by other than the top 20
shareholders. A widely held shareholding can be considered as an indication of the
firm concerned to be MC firm; narrowly held shareholding ls therefore an Indication of
OC firm. This is consistent with arguments offered by Craswell and Taylor (1992) and
Whittred (1987).
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Thus, consistent with this finding, the same ratio ls used to proxy for leverage in this
stucly.33

(3)

Finn size (SIZE)

There are several measures for firm size as cited in the literature. However, there
is no reason to choose one measure of size over another as no proxy for size should
outperform another (Hagerman & Zmijewski, 1979). Nevertheless, 1n the context of this
study, the firm size variable is measured by the natural logarithm of firm's total assets.
This proxy is considered appropriate as it reflects the overall resources available to the
flrms.34

(4)

Political visibility (PRESS)

Panchapakesan and McKinnon ( 1992) 1·eported that the level of press coverage in
a calender year was a good proxy for a firm's political visibility as perceived by the media.
The level of press coverage was me�sured as the number of times during the year an
article about the firm appeared in the 27 leading newspapers and business magazines
reviewed In 1985 (29 publications In 1986, and 32 publications in 1987) by the
Australian Business Index (ABI). This measure is consistent With the one used by
Deegan and Carroll ( 1993) and Panchapakesan and McKinnon ( 1992).

33

Other measures of leverage that have been either commonly found in debt covenants or
tested in previous studies are the ratios: (1) total liabilities dlvtded by shareholders
funds (Whlttred & Zimmer, 1986; Stokes & Tay, 1988), and (2) total liabilities dlvided
by total assets. The latter ratio has been used quite extensively in previous studies
especially those in the USA environment. However. since it is very likely that these
constructs of leverage to be highly correlated with one another due to common
denominator or common numerator, this study will only test the ratio total liabilities
dlvtded by total tangible assets.

34

The natural logarithm of a firm's total revenue has also been used in previous studies
as proxy for firm's Information production costs (for example, Choi (1989) and Sarni and
Welsh (1993) among others). Deegan and H�am (1991) and Wong (1988a & b) suggest
that net income after tax before extraordinary items Is a better proxy for firm size
because it is a proxy which tnkes into account the relative magnitude of positive and
negative wealth transfers. Accordingly, these constructs would also be tested.
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(5)

Financial performance (PERF)

Consistent with Sarni and Welsh (1992). a ratio was used to measure the change
of preadoption income as proxy for this variable. This ratio was calculated as: Adoption
year net income less prtor year net income divided by prtor year net income.35

(6)

Overseas association (OSEAS)

OSEAS is a dummy vartable to represent whether a firm is (1) a subsidiary of a
foreign listed firm in Canada or the UK or the USA; and/ or (2) concurrently listed in
Canada or the UK or the JSA. Firms that possessed either of these charactertstlcs were
given the value of 1, otherwise the value O were allocated to them.

Data sources

The primary source of data is the AGSM Annual Reports Microfiche File. Apart
from this. other source of data utilised include the publications by Stock Exchange
Research Pty Ltd, the Australian Business Index and Jobson's Public Company
Yearbook. From these sources, the information that were gathered for all lessees in the
final reporting sample are tabulated in Appendix A. The industry membership of the
reporting sample as classified by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges (AASE) is
reported in Appendix B.

35

Scott (1991) used a dichotomous dummy variable to proxy for change in firm's
preadoption Jncome. As an alternative, thJs proxy was also used. Firms with postttve
change in their preadoption net income were given the value of 1, whilst firms with
negattve in their preadoptlon net income were given the value of 0.
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The research design of this study is a pooled cross-sectional analysts for the
period 1985 to 1987.36 A between groups quasi-experimental design is used to test the
research hypotheses. A multivariate analysis is considered to be the appropriate
technique in View of the arguments forwarded by Bazley et al.. (1985), Scott (1991), and
Tabachnik and Fidell (1989). Bazley et al., (1985) and Tabachnik and Fidell (1989)
suggest that if it is suspected that there may have been some inter-dependence amongst
the independent variables, then a multivariate analysis is necessary. Scott (1991) further
argues that since political costs and agency costs (possibly also signalling costs) are
likely to be present in varying degrees and With opposite influence on management
across firms, Ma multivariate analysis that assesses the marginal impact of each while
controlling for the other is appropriate" {p. 66). The specific multivariate technique
chosen is the Logistic regression. It is chosen over other regression techniques, namely
the OLS regression and the Probit regression, based on the findings of studies by Stone
and Rasp (1991). and Maddala (1991) which examined numerous accounting choice
studies· statistical methodologies. 37

36

Whlttred and Chan ( 1992) found difficulty in deciding between a time series or a
pooled cross-sectional analysis methodology for their study. However, In this study a
pooled cross-sectional analysis Is considered appropriate because: First, it Is
conceivable that lessee firms that adopted capitalisation differ from those that adopted
note disclosure policy. Second, It Is not difficult to define what constitutes an
appropriate control group. I.e.. lessee firms that had finance lease commitments and
chose to disclose such commltmeuts In the notes. rather than capitalizing them.

37

Logistic regression calculates Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) for the parameters
with each independent variables. Logistic regression was employed in this study based
on the findings by Stone and Rasp I1991 I that:
whenever the functional form of the relationship Is non-linear (as Is usually the
case In dichotomous accounting policy choice studies), using OLS rather than
logit can result in higher misclassification rates. a number of meaningless
probability estimates. and less powerful tests of parameter estimates. Given
these problems ... logit rather than OLS ... be the preferable method ... even
when sample sizes technically are not ·1arge enough·. {p. 184)
Maddala (1991} concluded that for accounting studies, even in small samples, the
available evidence indicates that it is preferable to use problt or logtt models rather
than regression when the dependent variable Is dichotomous.
Furthermore, Aflfl and Clark { 1984) assert that logistic regression is appropriate when
both categorical and continuous variables are used, as in this study.
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Prior to performing the logistic regression, univariate diagnostics are undertaken
to screen the data for the evaluation of the assumption of univariate nonnality. 1bis is
despite logistic regression requires far fewer assumptions than multiple regression
analysts: and even when the assumptions for multiple regression analysts are satisfied,
logistic regression still performs well (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989: Hair, Anderson,
Tatham & Black, 1995: Maddala, 1991; Stone & Rasp, 1991). Tabachnik and Fidell
(1989) suggest that the starting point Is to analyse the descriptive statistics of each
independent variable. A normally distributed variable should have a skewness and
kurtosis value of zero; Indicating that the mean is equal to median. Additional
univariate diagnostics are performed including graphical examinations (histogram, box
whisker plots. and normal probability plots) and statistical tests (Shapiro-Wilks test and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). If the variables' distributions are not normally distributed.
then these variables should be transformed to remedy for outliers. non-normality and
heteroscedaclty (Erickson & Nosanchuk; 1992; Hair et al.. 1995; Tabachnik & Fidell.
1989).

Multivariate diagnostics are also performed before and after the logistic regression
analysis. The objectives of these diagnostics are ( 1) to assess multicollinearity among the
independent variables. and (2) to identify Influential observations that would impact the
logistic estimations (Belsley et al.. 1980; Fox. 1991; Hair et al., 1995). In assessing
multicollinearity, the relevant statistics are the bivariate correlations. the variance
inflation factor (VIF). and the tolerance levels. Influential observations can be detected
by analysing the studentized residuals (SRESID], the leverage points (LEVER), Cook's
distance (COOK). and the change in the logistic coefficients when a case is deleted from
the model (DFBETA). 38

38

All these statistical tests and diagnostics are performed using the statistical software
"SPSS for Macintosh" (SPSS. 1990) and "SYSTAT' (SYSTAT, 1990).
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The logistic regression model has six independent variables. However, since
alternative proxy variables have been developed for OCMC, SIZE, and PERF, this study
employs a sensitivity analysis by testing a total of 12 logtstic regression mode.ts, of which
one will be selected based on its goodness-of-fit with all independent va_rfables
(thereafter referred to as the explanatocy power), significance level, and classtftcation
accuracy rate.39 In order to support this selection, the selected model is subjected to a
valtdation process whereby the sample is split into two groups and the logistic regression
analyses are performed accordingly. The objective of this process is to find evidence that
would lend support and validity of the original selected model (Hair, et al., 1995 p.
147).40

The basic logistic regression model is expressed as follows:

y(O,IJ = o:l + Pl OCMC + p2 DEBT+ P3 SIZE+ P4 PRESS+ ps PERF + P6 OSEAS

+E

where

39

In logistic regression the following relevant !>tatlstlcs are noted. First. to determine
goodness-of-fit, the m:Jdel chi-square Is comparable to the overall F test for OLS
regression (SPSS Inc., 1990). Second. In testing hypotheses about the coefficients, the
Wald statistic is comparable to the t-statlstic in OLS muitiple regre.ssion (Hair et al.,
1995: SPSS Inc., l 990). Third. classification accuracy rate refers to the ability of the
model. on an overall basis, to correctly classify the sample into the corresponding
groups, which in this study relate to the capitalizer and non-capitalizer groups. Aldrich
and Nelson (1984) and Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) suggest different versions of
pseudo-R2 statistics, which is also comparable to the R2 of OLS regression, as a
measure of explanatory power of the logistic models. However, because Kit is not
universally accepted. let alone used" (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984, p. 57), and the
Kdifficulty with ... interpretation" (Demaris, 19921, this study will not be reporting this
statistic.

40

Hair et al .. ( 1995) state that the objective of tilt validation process ·is to ensure that the
results are generalizable to the population and not specific to the sample used In
estimation� (p. 147). They suggest that the most direct approach to validation is to
obtain another sample from the population and compare the results of the two samples.
This approach is however not practical In this study due to the nature of the sampling
frame and the sample selection process discussed earlier. In view of such a limitation,
the spllt sample approach taken in this study, as recommended by Hair et al., (1995).
Demaris (1992, pp. 55-56), suggests a statistic cross4validation probability of chance
error CPREcv) - that measures the predictive efficacy in logistic regression. This PREcv
indicates the level of reduction in prediction errors when the full model ls used to
predict the phenomenon.
4

4
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(X

is the constant value;

y(0.1)

is the dependent variable taking the value ( 1) if the lessee firm
capitalized finance leases. and (O) otherwise, i.e.• by footnote disclosure;

�n

represents the coefficient of the explanatory variables.

£

is the residual or prediction error

Summary

This chapter elaborated the sample selection process, the definitions of the
dependent and independent variables, the data sources used, and the various aspects of
the research design of this study. In the following chapter. the results of the data
analysis are reported.
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CHAPTER&
EIIPJRICAL RESULTS
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the various statistical analyses performed to
test the research hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The results are presented in four
major sections. First. characteristics of the sample selected are reported. This is followed
by a discussion on the descriptive statistics and the diagnostics performed prior to the
multivariate analysis. Third, an analysis of the results of the logistic regression including
the validation process is presented. which is followed by a summary.

Sample characteristics

Table 3 reports the composition and industry membership of the 1985-1987
sample; a total of 314 lessee firms classified into the capitalizer group with 67 lessee
firms and the non-capitalizer group with 247 lessee firms. A preliminary analysis of Table
3 shows that the number of resource firms in the capitalizer group is relatively more
than those in the non-capitalizer group. This is also the case for the other industries.
This suggests that there is a relationship between industry membership and the decision
to capitalize finance lease commitments. The statistical evidence supports this
proposition. The chi-square analysis reveals that there is a significant relationship
between firms' industry membership and their finance lease accounting policy choice (x2

= 12.850;

d.J = 3; p = 0.005).
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Tables
8em1te CrnnlMJD!el Gl'OIQ)ld Ugder Malm IDdJllta Claulflcatlon; 1985 · 1987
Industry

Capitalizer

Non-Capitalizer

Total

n

%

n

%

n

%

Industrtal & Commercial

35

52

183

74

218

69

Resources

21

31

47

19

68

22

Financial Institutions

2

3

4

2

6

2

Diversified companies

9

14

13

5

22

7

67

100

247

100

314

100

Total
x2 = 12.a5o; dJ. = 3; p = 0.005

Descriptive statistics and diagnostics

The descriptive statistics of the independent variables appear In Table 4 - Panels
A and B. An examination of the descriptive statistics of the interval-scaled variables in
Panel A shows that six of these variables suffer substantial skewness indicating non
normality. The results of supplementary graphical analysis and statistical tests for
normality including normal probability plot. Shapiro-Wilks test. and Kolmogorov
Smimov test support the earlier findings of examination of the descriptive statistics.
These variables are: PRESS, DEBT. SIZE(l}, SIZE{2), SIZE{3). and PERF(l}.

Results of the preceding evaluation of assumptions lead to transformation of the
relevant variables to reduce their skewness, reduce the number of outliers. and improve
the normality, linearity and homoscedacity of residuals. Natural logarithmic
transformation was used on PRESS. SIZE(l), S1ZE(2) and DEBT. Square-root
transformation was used on S1ZE(3) and PERF{l). The results of these transformations
appear 1n Panel B of Table 4.
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Table4

Panel A - Petcdptlye stattat1c;1 1985-1987 CBefore Data Transfo1m1ttonl
(1) Capitalizers (N = 67)

fe

Expected

Interval-

relation

variable

(1) > (2)

OCMC{2)

(1) < (2)

DEBT

(1) > (2)

Mean

Median

(2) Non-capitalizers( N = 247)

so

Median

Mean

so

14.698

13.443

27.565

26.700

0.513

0.255

0.634

0.518

1.883

430039.750

68192.000

1542575.478

371456.721

86419.000

795373.824

S1ZE(2)

289744.597

58202.000

935121.075

415221.146

73663.000

1076056.433

S1ZE(3)

19159.133

3012.500

97230.496

15994.642

3193.000

450'l2.360

(1) > (2)

P RESS

65.075

21.000

133.398

47.356

(1) > (2)

PERF(l)

-564.013

7.163

4299.489

157.369

24.122

21.010

0.540

SIZE(l)

21.000 �
19.261

Ordinalvariable

(0)

(1)

(0)

(1)

61

OCMC(l)

51

16

186

PERF(2) ••

22

34

60

184

OSEAS

62

5

222

25

•• Due to missing values, some companies are excluded.

76.542

2648.982

Table4

lMcJ P - Pc•cdpti:re stat11t1c1 1985-1987 l'After Data Tn.nsformatlonl
(2) Non-capitalizers (N = 247)

(1) Capitalizers (N= 67)

8

Expected

Interval-

relation

variable

Mean

Median

(1) > (2)

OCMC(2)

24.122

21.010

{I)< (2)

LnDEBT

0.411

(1) > (2)

LnSIZE(l)

SD

Median

Mean

so

13.443

27.565

26.700

0.406

0.167

0.407

0.409

0.251

11.380

11.129

1.644

11.540

11.367

1.624

LnS1ZE(2)

10.751

10.972

2.166

11.110

11.207

2.244

Sq5IZE(3)

333.916

318.866

80.183

334.444

319.149

53.066

(1} > (2}

LnPRESS

3.238

3.091

1.292

3.112

3.091

1.268

(1) > (2)

SqPERF(l)

174.918

178.126

23.914

178.444

178.160

6.102

Ordinalvariable
OCMC(l)

(0)

51

(I}

16

(0)

(1)
186

61

PERF(2) ••

22

34

60

184

OSEAS

62

5

222

25

•• Due to missing values, some companies are excluded.

14.698

A check on the direction of the mean differences of the tnteival-scaled variables
between the capitalizer and non-capitalizer groups discloses that only LnPRESS has its
mean differences 1n the hypothesised direction. Toe others, i.e., OCMC(2), LnDEBT,
LnSIZE( l), LnS1ZE(2), SqS1ZE(3), and SqPERF(l), have the direction contrary to
expectation. However, the findings may not hold 1n subsequent multivariate analysts.

Table 5 reports the correlation analysis among the independent variables.
Consistent with the results in the separate cross-sectional analysis, the present sample
also exhibits a number of significant bivariate correlations. For example, between
LnSIZE(l) and OCMC{2). between PERF(2) and LnPRESS, and between LnDEBT and
LnSIZE(2). This finding indicates some inter-dependence amongst the independent
variables, and thus, lends support to the appropriateness of multivariate regression
analysis, specifically the logistic regression (Bazley et al., 1985; Tabachnik & Fidell.

1989). Except for the bivariate correlations among the alternative constructs for firm size
(to be used separately In sensitivity analysis). none of the other bivariate correlations
reach 0.8. Thus, It is inferred that harmful multicollinearity among the independent
variables is not present. (Farrar & Gaulber. 1967: Lewis-Beck, 1987). An examination of
the tolerance levels and VIFs also corroborates this inference (Belsley et al., 1980; Fox.
1991).

Logistic regression results

Results of the sensitiVity analysis of the logistic regression appear in Table 6 Panels A to D.41 Only models 7. 8, 10. 11 and 12, are statistically significant. On an
overall basis, the Nbest" model is Model 10 because It has the highest explanatoxy power
(model x2

=

12.672; dJ.

=

6). most significant (p

=

0.0485), and a comparatively high

classification accuracy rate of 81.53%.
41

Senstuvity analysis was performed because for certain variables, there are more than
one construct to proxy for the variables. Consequently, 12 logistic regression models
were developed and tested.
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Tables
Variable

OCMC(l)

OCMC(l)

OCMC(2)
LnDEBr

e

OCMC(2)

1.000

I

LnDEBr

LnSIZE(l)

LnS1ZE(2)

S1ZE(3)

LnPRESS

0.510

I.OOO

-0.069

-0.085

I.OOO

0.131

0.0323

1.000

0.190

0.297

0.850

1.000

0.696

0.706

1.000

0.515

0.459

1.000

0.263

0.079

1.000

0.088

0.269

(0.000)
(0.110)

(0.069)

(0.091)

(0.011)

I

(0.029)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

LnPRESS I

(0.023)
0.077

(0.001)

(0.031)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.086)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.372)

(0.328)

(0.054)

(0.114)

(0.233)

(0.000)

(0.087)

(0.473)

(0.156)

(0.251)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.064)

(0.241)

(0.015)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.126)

LnSIZE(l)

LnS1ZE(2)
SqS1ZE(3)

0.075

SqPERF{l) I

PERF(2)
OSEAS

I
I

PERF(l)

0.106
0.114

0.019

0.003

-0.084

(0.()_E>S)

0.190

0.190

-0.026
0.059

-0.149

(0.005)

(0.000)

0.107

0.213

0.093

0.039

-0.040

0.670
0.070

0.200
0.122

0.042

0.219

0.169

0.476

0.172

-0.064

PERF(2)

1.000

(0.000)

0.003
(0.478)

OSEAS

0.079

(O.�)

1.000

Further examination of the result of Model 10 shows that the coefficient
LnDEBT, LnPRESS, and OSEAS are in the hypothesised direction, but only LnPRESS ls
highly slgntftcant at p < 0.05. Thus there Is strong support for the efficiency perspective
hypothesis H4, that capitalization is positively related to the level of press coverage as
proxy for a ftnn's political visibility. There is no evidence to accept the other five research
hypotheses.

In Model 10, the coefficients OCMC(2), LnS1ZE(2), and SqPERF(l) are not in the
expected direction. However. only OCMC(2) and SqPERF(l) are significant at p < 0.05.
The implication of this finding is that capitalization decision is more likely for lessee
firms that had narrowly-held shareholdings: and lessee firms with negative change in
net income from prior year.

Additional multivariate diagnostics were considered necessary to determine the
presence of any influential observation that could have impacted and biased the model's
estimations. The studentlzed residuals. leverage points. DFBETA and Cook's statistics
were examined and compared with the numerical cutoffs proposed by Hair et al., (1995)
and Fox {1991). The finding indicates absence of influential observations.

The next stage is to assess the validity and efficacy of Model l 0. This is achieved
by performing the split-sample validation process and the estimation of cross-validation
probability chance of error (PREcvl- In the split-sample validation process, the original
sample was randomly divided into two sub-samples (hereafter referred to as sub-1 and
sub-2). Logistic regressions were performed for sub-1 and sub-2 using the same
independent variables in Model 10. Results of this process appear in Table 7. On an
overall comparison. it appears that Model 10 is valid and generalisable model beyond the
sample. This is inferred from the result that Model 10 has highest explanatory power
and at a lowest significance level than sub-1 and sub-2. And its classification accuracy
rate Is in between that of sub-1 and sub-2.
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Table&

Panel A - Rgglta of J.otlltic BIOeHIPP,; 1985.1987 IN• S14l
Model 1

Model2

Model3
Coefficient
Wald stat.

Independent

Expected

Coefficient

vanable

relation

Wald stat.

Coefficient
Wald stat.

?

5.3577

4.0403

2.9088

0.6846

0.4167

0.2697

0.1448

0.1863

0.1227

0.1640

0.2681

0.1182

1.4185

1.3770

0.9327

1.8949b

I.857ob

0.8541

Constant

OCMC(l)

+

LnDEBT

LnSIZE(l)

+

-0.2714
3.2303a

LnS1ZE(2)

-0.1468

+

2.4555b
SqSIZE(3)

-0.0008

+

0.0739
LnPRESS

SqPERF(l)

OSEAS

Model x2
% correctly classified

+

+

+

0.3713

0.2580

0.1365

3.6872a

2.7399a

0.9920

-0.0314

-0.0303

-0.0283

0.7861

0.7572

0.8211

0.2607

0.2106

0.0232

0.2280

0.1508

0.0019

9.353

8.445

6.093

(p= 0.1547)

(p= 0.2073)

82.31%

82.31%

(p= 0.4128)
82.31%

a Slgnlflcant at p s 0.05
b Signlflcant at p s 0.10
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Taltle 8

Panel B - BelJllta of Lollftlc ...,._ 1985::1987 111 • 814)
Mode14

Mode15

Mode16

Independent

Expected

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

variable

relation

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

?

-0.2076

-1.0311

-1.6146

0.0290

1.8601b

3.6445a

0.0723

0.1002

0.0620

0.0416

0.0792

0.0304

0.0546

0.1092

0.0181

0.0092

0.0363

0.0009

Constant

OCMC{l)

+

LnDEBT

LnSIZE(l)

+

-0.1835
1.6829b

LnS1ZE(2)

+

-0.0967
1.1974

SqS1ZE(3)

+

-0.0002
0.0045

LnPRESS

PERF(2)

OSEAS

Model x.2
% correctly classtfted

+

+

+

0.3755

0.2928

0.1958

3.8693a

3.5727a

2.1852b

-0.6732

-0.6460

-0.7226

4.2827a

3.8105a

4.9001a

0.2129

0.1703

0.0563

0.1536

0.0997

0.0109

8.688

8.166

6.988

(p= 0.1919)

(p=0.2262)

(p=0.3220)

81.88%

81.88%

81.88%

a Significant at p s 0.05
b Significant at p s 0.10
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Table&

Panel C - Benltl o(Lollftlc Bcll'.CIIJon; lHl::1987 (N• 114)
Model 7

Model 8

Model9

Independent

Expected

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

variable

relation

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

?

7.4598

5.9309

3.9205

0.4565

0.3177

0.2577

-0.0196
2.7422a

-0.0J.92
2.6388a

-0.0206

3.0453a

1.0304

0.9175

0.6109

0.9904

0.8132

0.3615

Constant

OCMC(2)

+

LnDEBT

LnSIZE(l)

+

-0.2572
2.8229a

LnSIZE(2)

-0.1203

+

1.5193
SqSIZE(3)

-3.4E-05

+

0.0002
LnPRESS

SqPERF(l)

OSEAS

Model x2
% correctly classified

+

+

+

0.4423

0.3155

0.2071

4.8839a

3.7191a

2.1180b

-0.0413

-0.0393

-0.0325

0.4568

0.4491

0.5647

0.1333

0.0585

-0.1249

0.0576

0.0112

0.0531

12.518

11.113

9.612

(p= 0.0514)

(p= 0.0850)

(p= 0.1420)

81.98%

81.98%

81.98%

a Significant at p s 0.05
b Slgntftcant at p s 0.10
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Table 8

Panel D · BelJlltA of LoJlltlc BeaelllPA; 1985-1987 fN • S14l
Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

Independent

Expected

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

variable

relation

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

?

0.1550

-0.7107

-1.3623

0.0151

0.7360

2.5352b

-0.0194

-0.0201

2.7514a

-0.0192
2.6978 a

2.9262a

-0.1316

-0.0991

-0.1667

0.0498

0.0270

0.0683

Constant

OCMC(2)

+

LnDEBT

LnSIZE(l )

+

-0.1759
1.5114b

LnS1ZE{2)

+

-0.0798
0.7617

SqS1ZE(3)

+

0.0005
0.0362

LnPRESS

PERF(2)

OSEAS

Model x2

+

+

+

0.4388

0.3455

0.2565

4.9971a

4.5860a

3.4677a

-0.7117

-0.7010

-0.7687

4.6399a

4.3904a

5.3449a

0.0973

0.0422

-0.0788

0.0311

0.0059

0.0208

12.672

11.900

11.184

(p=

% correctly classified

0.0485)

81.53%

a Significant at p S 0.05
b Significant at p s 0.10
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(p=

0.0642)

81.53%

(p=

0.0829)

81.53%

Closer analysis of the results of sub-I and sub-2 provides additional evidence
supporting the above mentioned inference. All coefficients 1n sub-I yield directions
consistent with Model 10. However, where OCMC(2) is significant 1n Model 10, it is not
signtftcant 1n sub-I. With regard to the result of sub-2, the direction of all coefficients
except that LnDEBT, are consistent with those of Model 8. But, where OCMC{2) and
SqPERF(l) are significant 1n Model 10. they are not significant 1n sub-2. Thus, analysis
of individual coefficient and its significance level reveals that the split-sample validation
process support the validity of Model I 0.

In terms of the predictive efficacy, estimation of PREcv yields evtdence suggesting
that Model I O is an efficacious model. When compared with the result of sub- I and sub2, the estimated PREcv is 41.72%% and 44.60% respectively. Thus, it is inferred that the
prediction error 1s reduced by about one half when using Model 10 to predict whether a
lessee firm will capitalize Its finance lease commitments. In conclusion, based on the
evidence derived from the split-sample validation process and the estimation of PREcv,
Model 10 is a valid, generalisable and efficacious model.

Summary

It is apparent that the result of the pooled cross-sectional analysis provides
strong evidence to accept only one of the six research hypotheses. Whilst the lack of
explanatory power could be attributed to the theoretical framework. or the research
methodology adopted or both. there are perhaps other factors that could have
confounded the result. These factors include significant accounting events; that is. the
Issuance and introduction of new accounting standards that have the potential to
affect lessee firms' accounting policy choices and also their profitability and financial
structure.
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Table?

but Semple YIUdatlon of Loldltic BeOCHlon Bftlmatlon: 1911:1987
Model 10

Sub-I

Sub-2

(N= 314)

(n= 155)

(n= 159)

Independent

Expected

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

variable

relation

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

Wald stat.

?

0.1550

1.1529

-0.5545

0.0151

0.3431

0.1062

-0.0194

-0.0193

-0.0105

2.7514a

1.2750

0.3939

-0.!316

-0.8542

1.5972

0.0499

0.6669

1.3998

-0.1759

-0.2378

-0.1884

1.5114b

1.1036

0.9448

0.4388

0.5267

0.3510

4.9971a

3.1075a

1.8405b

-0.7117

-1.1899

-0.3937

4.6389a

5.5020a

0.7405

0.0973

0.5350

0.0499

0.0311

0.3415

0.0049

12.672

11.521

5.171

(p= 0.0485)

(p= 0.0735)

(p= 0.5221)

81.53%

82.27%

80.82%

Constant

OCMC(2)

+

LnDEBT

LnSIZE(2)

LnPRESS

SqPERF(l)

OSEAS

Model .,_2
% correctly classified

+

+

+

+

a Slgnitlcant at p s 0.05
b Significant at p s 0.10
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In 1985, the accounting standard AAS 18 Accounting for Goodwill (AARF, ASB,
1985) was Issued. Furthermore, In 1986, AAS 19 Accounting for Joint Ventures (AARF,
ASB, 1986a), and AAS 20 Accounting for Foreign Currency Translation (AARF, ASB,
1986b) promulgated. Finally. in 1987, the ASRB approved the adoption of ASRB 1011
Accounting for Research and Development (R&D) Costs (ASRB, 1987). These accounting
standards limit the options for firms to account for goodwill, Joint venture transactions,
foreign subsidiaries financial statements, and R&D costs respectively. As a result. these
events influenced finns' accounting policy choices and also their profitability and
financial structures. 42

Another factor that could have confounded the result relates to the significance
of finance lease arrangement for lessee firms that chose to capitalize them. Appendix D
reveals that on average. throughout 1985-1987 capitalized leased assets and capitalized
lease liabilities only represented less than three percent of capitalizers' total assets and
total liabilities respectively. This is further supported by a finding that in 1988 (the first
year the requirements of AAS 17 became mandatory}. on average the capitalized lea.sed
assets and capitalized lease liabilities represented about three per cent of capitalizers·
total assets and five per cent of capitalizers' total liabilities respectively. 43 This
preliminary evidence suggests that finance lease accounting policy was not a major
agenda in terms of policy choices and its effect on the lessee firms' profitability and
financial structure. This finding also leads to the inference that for the non-capitalizers,
their finance lease commitments may even be less significant than those of the
capitalizers, and consequently adopted the footnote disclosure accounting policy based
on the arguments that it is an adequate form of reporting (Abdel-khalik et al., 198 l a;
Bowman, 1980; Finnerty et al., 1980: Houghton, 1984: Lawrence & Bear, 1986; Murray,
1982, Narayanaswamy. 1994; Wilkins & Zimmer, 1983a).
42

This explanation suggests and re-affirms that a firm has a portfolio of accounting
policies at its disposal (Zmijewski & Hagerman, 1981).

43

A random sample of 37 lessee firms In 1988 were selected of which about 60% of them
had finance lease commitments. They complied With the capitalization requirement of
MS 17.
70

Notwithstanding the preceding 11mttations and plausible confounding factors,
the logistic regression model 10 has been found to be a valid, generalisable beyond the
sample, and efficacious model.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary

The objective of this study is to answer the research question of: Why a group of
lessee firms chose to capitalize whilst others chose to report via footnote disclosure their
respective finance lease commitments during the transitional or phase-in period (1985
1987) as permitted by MS 17. Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the history and the
features of MS 17. with particular attention on the transitional provision and the
finance lease accounting choice. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of the
capitalization debate supported by empirical evidence.

Chapter 3 deals With the review of the selected similar published studies of
accounting policy choice. The purpose of this review is to identify areas of improvement
that could be incorporated into this study. These improvements are elaborated in
subsequent chapters of this thesis.

As a subsequent chapter, Chapter 4 relates to the discussion on the theory
development and hypotheses formulation. A combined theory of contracting theory
(efficient contracting perspective) and signalling theory has been employed as the
underlying theoretical framework. From this framework a general hypothesis was
formulated, that is, lessee firms choose to capitalize finance lease rather than adopt
footnote disclosure in order to reduce or mitigate the agency costs and/or political costs
and also to signal to t'1e market that they are high quality firms, which consequently
would lead to maximizing the value of the firm. To test this general hypothesis. six
research hypotheses were formulated and proxted by six constructs as explanatory
variables. These variables are: Corporate structure, debt contracting, firm size, political
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visibility, financial performance, and overseas association. The dependent variable is the
finance lease accounting choice: Capitalization or footnote disclosure.

In Chapter 5, the sample selection process was discussed and followed by the
definitions of the dependent and independent variables. Ulis chapter also describes the
data that were collected for each year of 1985, 1986 and 1987 from various sources
which include the AGSM Annual Reports Microfiche File, the publications by the Stock
Exchange Research Pty Ltd (Stock Exchange Research Pty Ltd, 1986, 1987 & 1988),
Jobson's Public Company (and Mining) Year Book (Dunn & Bradstreet, 1986, 1987 &
1988), and the Australian Business Index (Australian Business Intelligence, 1986, 1987
& 1988). Finally the research design aspects of this study was discussed in this chapter.
It was considered appropriate to employ a multivariate analysis, in particular the logistic
regression, to test the data for pooled cross-sectional analysis.

Chapters 6 presents the results of the statistical analyses undertaken in this
study. The results discussed in these chapters Include the descriptive statistics.
regression diagnostics. logistic regression with sensitivity analysis. and regression model
validation process.

Conclusion

The objective of this study is to examine the economic factors motivating
Australian listed lessee companies to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure of their
finance lease commitments throughout 1985 to 1987. as permitted by the transitional
provision of the accounting standard AAS 17: Accounting for Leases. It is hypothesised
that the decision to capitalize, rather than to disclose finance lease commitments in the
footnotes of the financial statements, Is positively related to a firm's (1) corporate
structure, (2) debt contract financial constraints, (3) size, (4) political visibility, (5)
financial performance, and (6) overseas association.
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Pooled croa.-.ectloml ana1yala

The result reveals that only hypothesis H4 ts supported. Thus, on average for the
transitional period, the capitalization decision was positively related to lessee firm's
political visibility as measured by the level of press coverage. It can also be inferred that
capitalization may be used by lessee firms as a means of reducing wealth transfers
related to the political process and also as a signal to the market that they are high
quality firms. The result also indicates findings that are contrary to expectation. It is
found that capitalization decision was negatively related to firm's ownership structure,
size, and financial performance: of which only size Is not significant. This perplex finding
could be explained by alternative plausible hypotheses.

Alternative plausible hypotheses

Notwithstanding the findings of this study, there are perhaps other plausible
explanations motivating a firm to capitalize rather than disclosing its finance lease
commitments in the footnotes of the financial statement during the transitional period.
1\vo plausible hypotheses are offered.

First, firms that capitalized their finance lease commitments prior to the
mandatory compliance date of AAS 17 had a different set of motives other than those
suggested in this study. There is evidence in the literature suggesting that early adopters
of accounting standards. as in the case of the capitalizers in this study, time their
adoption with the view to "earnings management" (Ali & Kumar, 1993; Gujarathi &
Hoskin. 1992: Pincus & Wasley. 1994).

Second, the research question may perhaps be better explained by adopting a
socio-economic paradigm rather than an economic paradigm of economic consequences
theory used in this study (Mangos & Lewis, 1995; Neu, 1992). This socio-economic
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paradigm suggests the Inclusion of social factors In the analysis because managers,
being ..economic actors are Influenced by their environment and also have the ability to
Influence that environment" (Mangos & Lewis, 1995 p. 56).

Umltationa of the •tudy

Whilst every effort has been taken to ensure that this is a thorough and rigorous
study, there are inherent limitations in it. As this study is an example of positive
accounting research, it suffers from the limitations that have been well documented and
expounded by Holthausen (1990), Holthausen and Leftwich (1983). and Watts and
Zimmerman (1990). Among others, these limitations include specification errors in either
the left-hand side (dependent) variable. or the right-hand side {independent) variables or
both (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983: Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). With respect to the
specification error of the left-hand side variable, it was inherently assumed in this study
that firms use single capitalization of finance lease commitments policy to reduce or
mitigate agency costs ant ,Jolitical costs and to signal to the market. However. there is
evidence to indicate that firms use a portfolio of accounting procedures and policies
rather than single accounting policy (Zmijewski & Hagerman. 1981). This study also
acknowledges the possible specification error of the right-hand side variables relating to
the imprecise measurement constructs of the proxy variables used as independent
variables in this study (Holthausen & Leftwich. 1983; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).

Another potential limitation of this study is that the practices relating to
accounting treatment of finance lease commitments in the year of issuance of AAS 17
and during the period of exposure draft ED 17 were not examined. During this period,
some lessee firms may have already capitalized finance leases in anticipation of AAS 17
(Godfrey & Warren, forthcoming). This is possible because about half of the resJ>l)ndents
to ED 17 supported the capitalization policy (Roberts, 1982). Thus, the practices of
lessee firms during this period may confound the analysis of this study.
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Apart from the preceding limitations, further shortcomings of this study are the
very modest explanatory power and the lack of explanations for findings that are
contrary to expectations. As noted by Bazley et al., (1985) that "the results here [as tn
the case of this study) have confirmed the difficulty we have in explaining discretionary
accounting policy choice. This 'relatively modest' explanatory power ... is not unique to
this study" (p. 61). Other accounting policy studies which exhibit modest explanatory
power include the studies by Brown. lzan, and Loh (1992), Whittred and Chan (1992),
and Wilkins and Mok (1991).

Impllcatlons of this study

The findings of this study provide the following implications, even though only
one of the research hypotheses was supported by the result. First. the variable level of
press coverage has been found to be an important predictor and proxy for firm's political
visibility. This is a significant finding because it Is an evidence that firms will act
efficiently in responding to the media's perception of their level of political visibility, and
at the same time signalling that they are not endeavouring to mislead the market by
adopting an accounting policy that is both income reducing / deferral in principle and
purporting to show the economic substance of finance lease commitments.

Second, whilst the standard setters may believe that a lengthy transitional
period is useful to the lessee firms and users of financial statements, the evidence of this
study suggests otherwise. This is because at the end of 1987 only about 21% of the total
sampled lessee firms (67 out of 314 firms) that had finance lease commitments opted to
capitalize early. Furthennore, in Appendix D, there is primafacie evidence that among
the capitalizers the level of average capitalized leased assets had reduced from 1985 to
1987. This suggests that lessee firms had during the period not only re-negotiated the
existing finance lease agreements but possibly re-negotiated with the lessors to make the
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existing finance lease commibnents appear as an operating lease and thus not brought
into account (Abdel-khalik, 1981; Godfrey & Warren, forthcoming; Whittred & Zimmer,
1992). This form of reaction by the lessee ts contrary to the spirit of the standard, which
did not intend to encourage lessees to circumvent the provisions of AAS 1,· but to allow
lessees the opportunity "to gain experience in presenting .. . information relating to
leases.. {para. 34). Therefore. it is plausible to hypothesise that multi-year adoption
period is a political rather than an economic arrangement {Langer & Lev, 1993) which
gave firms the opportunity to manipulate income (Pincus & Wasley, 1994; Soo, 1991).

The implication of the findings of this study to the users of financial statements
is not to support any proposal to have a lengthy phase-in period in future accounting
standards. This is because during this period, as in this case, the transitional period of
AAS 17, the financial statements of lessee firms were incomparable due to different
finance lease accounting policies adopted by the lessees, that is capitalized or expensed.
There are costs, private and social, resulting from a reduction in cross-company (lessee)
comparability (Langer & Lev, 1993). Since different lessee firms used different finance
lease accounting policy, it complicates "the cross-sectional adjustment of financial
statements to a uniform basis" (Langer & Lev. 1993 p. 516).

Suggested areas for future research

One area for future research is to test the hypothesis of income smoothing by the
capitalizers. It is an empirical question whether or not the capitalizers took the
opportunity of voluntary early adoption for income smoothing purposes. The findings of
this study would help, among others. the standard setters to either continue or cease
the policy of providing a lengthy phase-in period for new accounting policy requirements.
At present, these phase-in provisions are provided so as to give the financial statements
preparers ample time and opportunity to grasp and understand the requirements of the
accounting standards. However, if by this proposed study it is found that firms took this
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advantage for income smoothing or bath effect purposes, then arguably the reasons for
having such lengthy phase-in periods as offered by the standard setters are indeed
unjustttled. (Langer & Lev, 1993; Pincus & Wasley, 1994).

Another area for future research is to extend the application of the joint
contracting/signalling framework in examining the economic factors motivating lessee
firms' choice to either adopt early or defer the adoption of the requirement to capitalize
their finance lease within the phase-in period. Findings of similar studies in the
literature indicate that besides certain economic factors like firm size and leverage, the
financial statements effect of adoption is a significant factor influencing a firm's
accounting policy adoption timing choice. These studies include the studies by Ayres
(1986}, Trombley (1989). Scott (1991). Ali and Kumar (1994). and Tung and Weygandt
(1994). As no similar studies have been done in the Australian environment. this area of
future research represents an opportunity to understand the motivations and
behaviours of Australian firms. Furthermore. it also represents an opportunity to extend
the generalisaoility of the methodologies and the findings of studies done in the USA
environment.

Finally this study could be replicated In other countries especially in countries
that developed their accounting standards based on the one formulated by the
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This Is because, the equivalent
IASC standard on lease accounting, IAS 17: Accounting for Leases (IASC, 1982). also
has a lengthy transitional or phase-in period. The findings of such studies would
enhance understanding on cross-cultural behaviours of managers in accounting policy
choices (Hofstede, 1983 & 1984}.
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AppendlxA

Dam Collected From AGSM rue and Other Source,
( 1)

Lessee's name

(2)

Industry category

(3)

Net profit (a) current year; (b) plior year

(4)

Tax expense: {a} current year: (b) plior year

(5)

Interest expense: (a) current year: (b) prior year

( 6)

Extraordinary items: (a) current year; (b) prior year

(7 )

Finance lease charges

(8)

Total revenues

(9)

Total tangible assets

{ I 0)

Total assets: (a) current year: (b) prior year

(11)

Total liabilities: {a) current year: (b) prior year

(12)

Shareholders· funds: (a) current year: (b) prtor year

(13)

Current lease commitments

(14)

Financial/ capital leased assets

(15)

Total lease liabilities

{16)

Amortisation of leased assets

(19)

Percentage of ordinary shares held by top 20 shareholders

(20)

Foreign parent company

(21)

Overseas exchange listing status

(22)

Press coverage
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.appendb:B
AuttuJl•n Apoclated Stock ksb101e (AASE) Indqatry C]gdflc,tlon
{1985 - 1987)
Automotive
Banks
Builders and Suppliers
Chemicals
Developers and Contractors
Diversified Resources
Elecf:Iical and Durables
Entrepreneurtal Investors
Finance
Food Sectors
He,,.vy Engineering
Insurance
Investment and Trustees
Light Engineering
Media
Metals
Merchants and Agents
Miscellaneous and Diversified Industrials
Miscellaneous Services
Oil and Gas
Paper and Packaging
Property Trusts
Retail
Solid Fuels
Textiles
Transport
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•

The financial charactertstlcs of the capitalizers and the non-capitalizers have to be
comparable before any between groups statistical testtngs can be performed. This can be
achieved in either one of the following way: (1) to adjust the non- capitalizers' financial
vartables as if they had capitalized their finance lease commitments (or constructive
capitalization); (2) to adjust the capitalizers' financial variables as if they had
periodically expensed, rather than capitalized, their finance lease commitments.
However, since the former is not feasible due to unavailability of information to reliably
estimate the implicit interest rates, finance lease charges. present value of obUgations,
fair values, and amortisation expense, the latter method of adjustment was opted. This
is because AAS 17 (para. 57) requires the capitalizers to disclose additional information
that enable the necessary adjustments to be made.

Table Cl
A4Justments to Remove the Effect of Capitall�ation of the Capitalizer Group's
Financial Variables

Adjustments

Financial variables
Total liabilities

Total liabilities (less) total capitalized lease liabilities

Total tangible assets

Total tangible assets (less) total capitalized leased assets

Total assets

Total assets (less) total capitalized leased assets

Adoption year net income

Adoption year net income before extraordinary items
(add) adoption year finance lease charges (add) adoption
year amortisation of finance leases (less) estimated lease
commitment due not later than one year
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Appendb:D

Table Dl
Panel A; Prqportlon of Mean CaplteJIR4 Leud..Auets to Mean Total Auet·
($'OOO}; CQlteJIRJ lrOJI»,

Year

Leased assets

Total assets

Proportion (%)

1!)85

11395.892

532817.243

2.138

1986

14329.800

226493.100

6.326

1987

3851.412

328670.941

1.171

1985-1987

9850.313

430039.750

2.290

Panel B; Proportion of Mean CQitallzed Lease LlabWtles to Mean Total Liabllltles•
($'000) ; CApitallzer o:oup.

Year

Lease liabilities

Total liabilities

Proportion (%)

1985

8429.158

258235.474

3.264

1986

14040.000

140973.300

9.959

1987

3139.263

167504.105

l.874

1985-1987

7766.478

215003.866

3.612

Panel C; PJ:cmortlon of Mean Ca,pltallzed Leased Assets C& Mean Ca,plteJlzed Lease
Liabilltlesl to Mean Total Assets (Mean Total LiabWtiesl• ($'OOO); 1988

Year

Leased assets

Total assets

Proportion (%)

1988

22116.318

755440.682

2.927

Year

Lease Liabilities

Total liabilities

Proportion (%)

1988

20969.864

414620.727

5.057

• Mjusted for capita.Uzatloa of finance leases (see Appendix C)
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AppendlxE

List of Companies iD the Sample
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Non-captt•Jlun (footnote cUaclQsew

Brash Holdings Ltd

- 1986

Bridgestone Australia Ltd

ACI International Ltd

Broadlands Finance Ltd

Acrow Australia Ltd

Bruck Australia Ltd

Adelaide & Wallaroo Fertilizers Ltd

BTR Nylex Ltd

.t\FL Holdings Ltd

Bunntngs Ltd

AFM Developments Ltd

Caltex Australia Ltd

Amalgamated Holdings Ltd

Cameronic Technology Corporation Ltd

Amalgank'1.ted Wireless Ltd

C«11ada Northeast Australia OU NL

Amatil Ltd

Carpenters Investment Trading Ltd

Ampol Ltd

Carr Boyd Mineral Ltd

Angus & Coote Holdings Ltd

Carrier Air Conditioning Holdings Ltd

APM Ltd

Cascade Brewery Company Ltd

Amotts Ltd

C & C Bottlers Ltd

Atkin Carlyle Ltd

Chalmers Ltd

ATS Resources Ltd

Chamberlain Holdings Ltd

Austen & Butta Ltd

Cheetham Ltd

Austral Group Ltd

Clyde lndustr.es Ltd

Asiatii; Pacific Resources Ltd

Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd

Austmark International Ltd

Communications & Entertainment Ltd

Australian Chemical Holdings Ltd

Comsteel Vickers Ltd

Australian Consolidated Mineral Ltd

Consolidated Rutile Ltd

Australian Merchant Holdings Ltd

Costain Ltd

Australian National Industries Ltd

G E Crane Holdings Ltd

Bank of Queen5land Ltd

Cudgen RZ Ltd

Barrack Mines Ltd

Cultus Pacific Ltd

Bennet & Fisher Ltd

Davies Brothers Ltd

Blue Circle Ltd

Defiance Mills Ltd

Boral Ltd

Dominion Mining & OU NL

103

Dunlop Olympic Ltd

Hills Industries Ltd

Eagle Corporation

Holland (John) Holdings Ltd

East African Coffee Plantations Ltd

Home Energy Group

Edward Dunlop & Co. Ltd

Humes Ltd

Elders IXL Ltd

Hunter Resources Ltd

Elders Resources Ltd

ICI Australia Ltd

Enacon Ltd

Industrial Equity Ltd

Energy Resources Ltd

Industrial & Pastoral Holdings Ltd

ENI'Ltd

lntemaUonal Combustion Australia Ltd

Entrad Corporation Ltd

Ivanhoe

Evans Deakin Industries Ltd

Jasco Holdings Ltd

Fairfax (John) Ltd

Jingellic Minerals Ltd

Faulding {FH) & Co. Ltd

Johns Perry Ltd

Fielder Gillespie DaVies Ltd

Jones (DaVid) Ltd

Gene Link Limited

Jonray

General Investment Australia Ltd

Kemtron Ltd

Gibson Chemical Industries Ltd

Keywest Investments Ltd

Goliath Cement Holding::; Ltd

Kia Or-:t Gold Corporation NL

Gordon & Gootch Limited

Kilndried Timber lndustrit!s Ltd

Greenbushes Tin Ltd

Kurts (Peter) Properties Ltd

Griffiths Brothers Ltd

Lanes Motor Holdings Ltd

Group Property SerVices Ltd

Ludowici & Sons Ltd

Hanirnex Corporation Ltd

MacBesser Ltd

Hardie (James) Ltd

Mcilwraith McEacharn Ltd

Hawker De Havtlland Ltd

Mayne Nickless Ltd

Henderson's Industries Ltd

Metals Exploration Co.

Henry & Walker Ltd

Metro Industries Ltd

Herald & Weekly Tunes Ltd

Mildara Wines Ltd

Hill Minerals

MIM Holdings Ltd
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Mitsubls'. u Motors Australia Ltd

QUF Industries Ltd

Monier Ltd

Renison Goldftelds Consolidated Ltd

Moonie Oil Co. Ltd

Repco Corporation

Moore Business Systems Aust. Ltd

Richardson (D) & Sons Ltd

Mortlock Brothers Ltd

Rovers Holdings Ltd

Muswellbrook Energy & Minerals Ltd

SA BreWing Holdings Ltd

Myer Emporium Ltd

Sabco Ltd

Nally Ltd

Santos Ltd

National Consolidated Ltd

Siddons Industries Ltd

National 1iustee Exec. & Agency Co.

Simpson Holdings Ltd

News Corp. Ltd

Smith (Howard) Ltd

Nicholas KiWi Australasia Ltd

Softwood Holdings Ltd

Nilsen Australia Ltd

Shannons Ltd

North Broken Hills Ltd

Southern Farmers Group Ltd

Oakbrtdge Ltd

Speedo Holdings Ltd

Oceanic Equity Ltd

Spotless Group Ltd

Offshore Oil NL

Sunshin� Australia Ltd

P & 0 Australia Ltd

Syme (David) & Co. Ltd

Pancontinental Petroleum Ltd

Taubmans Industries Ltd

Paynter Dixon Holdings Ltd

Thomas & Coffey Ltd

Peko-Wallsend Ltd

Thorn EMI Australia Ltd

Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd

Tooth & Co. t.td

Peters (WA) Ltd

Tt;bemakers of Australia Ltd

Petersville Sleigh Ltd

T\:VT Ltd

Phillps Industries Ltd

Union Carbide Aust. & New Zealand Ltd

Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd

Unity Corporation Ltd

Plumrose Australia Ltd

Universal Telecasters Ltd

Poseldon Ltd

Varn Ltd

Qintex Ltd

Vox Adeon Holdings Ltd
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Walton Bonds Ltd

Comalco Ltd

Watt (James) Group J td

CRALtd

Waugh & Josephson HoldingsLtd

Davis {Charles)Ltd

WebsterLtd

Golconds. Minerals

Westfield Holdings Ltd

Golden Grove

Westinghouse Brake & Signal Co.

Goodman Ltd

{Australia) Ltd

Gunns Kilnd Ltd

Westralian Forest Industries Ltd

Hancock & Gore Ltd

Whittakers Ltd

Horwood Bagshaw Ltd

Winterbottom Ltd

Mcconnel Dowell Ltd

Woodside Petroleum

Mt. Carrtgnton Mines

Wonnald International Ltd

National Venture Ltd

Wright (Walter) lndustrtes Ltd

Netmap Corporation Ltd

York Motor Holdings Ltd

PAL Ltd
Pacific Dunlop Ltd

Non-capitall;;ers (footnote disclosers)

Petro Energy

- 198�

Pine Vale

Amcor Ltd

Pioneer Sugar Ltd

Ariadne Austr..ilia Ltd

Provincial Newspapers Ltd

Bell Ltd

Rothwells Ltd

Bisley Investment Corporation Ltd

Smith (Henry) Ltd

Brambles Industries Ltd

Stokes Australasia Ltd

Brick & Pipe Industries Ltd

Strategic Minerals

BT Insurance Ltd

Viscount Holdings Ltd

Bundaberg Sugar Co. Ltd

Wattyl Ltd

Bums Philips & Co. Ltd

WCPLtd

BWD Industries Ltd

Weston {George) Foods Ltd

carrlcksLtd

Woolworths Ltd

Cereus Australia Ud
\06

Non-caplteJIBD (footnote 411eto,enl

Base Resources Ltd

· 1987

Bond Corporation Ltd

Advertiser Newspapers Ltd

Brtstile Ltd

Associated Broadcasting Services Ltd

BHP Ltd

Clayton Roband Ltd

Cherry Lane Fashion Group Ltd

Coles Myer Ltd

City & Suburban Properties Ltd

Compute.r Power Ltd

Coal & Allied Industries Ltd

Comrealty Ltd

Coventr:· Motor Replacements Ltd

Danomic Investment Ltd

Crusader Oil NL

Euro-national Ltd

CSR Ltd

First Investors Security Ltd

Eglo Engineering Services Ltd

Gaza.I Corporation Ltd

Endeavour Resources Ltd

Ghvan Ltd

Energy Research Group Ltd

Golden Shamrock

�WI Ltd

Gordon Pacific

Hartogen

ICAL Ltd

Hiteks Ltd

McOonnel & East Ltd

IDAPS Australia Ltd

National Properties Ltd

Leighton Holdings Ltd

Normandy Resources

Linter Groups Ltd

Pan Australian Mini?1g

Malco Industries Ltd

Reid (Malcolm) Ltd

McKay (Ralph)

Rothmans Holdings Ltd

Minerals. Mining & Metallurgy Ltd

TNT Ltd

Osborne Metals Ltd

White (Joe)

Pacific Cooper Ltd
Pancontinental Mining Ltd

Capitalizers - 1985

Parry Corporation Ltd

Allied Queensland Coalfields Ltd

Pelsart Resources NL

Ashton

Pennant Holdings Ltd

Austram Ltd

Reckitt & Coleman Australla Ltd
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Reid (Walter} & Co. Ltd

Kem Corporation Ltd

Shearer (John} Ltd

Macmahon Holdings Ltd

Timber Holdings Ltd

Meridian Oil NL

Tinsley Corporatlr

Metals Manufacturing Ltd

Ltd

Wesfarmers Ltd

Natcorp Investments

White Industries Ltd

Palmer Tube Ltd
Petroz

CUltaUzers - 1986

Segenhoe Ltd

APA Holdings Ltd

SA Gas Ltd

Australia Gas Light Co. Ltd

Total Assets Ltd

Australian Mining Investment
Eastern Resources Ltd
GKN Kwikform Ltd
Hastings Deering Ltd
Mangrovfte Industries Ltd
Newtech Development Corporation Ltd
Queensland Cement & Lime Co. Ltd
Queensla.,d Press Ltd

Capitalizers - 1987
Alcan Ltd
Australian Resort
Bond Media Ltd
Bridge Oil Ltd
Cadbury Schweppes Ltd
Coal & Carbon
Colly Farms Cotton Ltd
Giant Resources
Income Group Ltd
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